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ABSTRACT
Oftentimes, training a large-scale deep learning neural network on a single machine
becomes more difficult in a complex network model. Distributed training provides
an efficient solution, but opens up participating workers to Byzantine attacks.
This problem emerges when some workers cheat during uploading gradients or
weights to the central server, e.g., the information received by the server is not
always the true result computed by workers. In order to address this problem, we
investigate Byzantine problems in distributed machine learning and respectively
defend against these kinds of attacks in three scenarios: i) classic distributed
machine learning; ii) federated learning; and iii) quantum federated learning.
In order to defend against Byzantine attacks in distributed machine learning, two
algorithms are proposed for both e↵ectiveness and efficiency. We propose
FABA(Fast Aggregation against Byzantine Attacks) and VBOR (Variance-Based
Outlier Removal). They are both based on the idea of removing the outliers in the
uploaded gradients and obtaining gradients that are close to the true gradients.
FABA is efficient and e↵ective against Byzantine attacks. VBOR is specifically for
large-scale distributed machine learning. We show the convergence of these
algorithms. The experiments demonstrate that our algorithms can achieve similar
performance to non-Byzantine cases and higher efficiency compared to previous
algorithms.
In order to defend against Byzantine attacks in federated learning, we first
compare two di↵erences in federated learning: first, each worker keeps its own
non-i.i.d. private dataset and second, malicious workers take over the majority in
some iterations. In this work, we propose a novel reference dataset-based
Two-Filter algorithm ToFi to defend against Byzantine attacks in federated
learning. Our experiments highlight the e↵ectiveness of our algorithm compared
with previous algorithms in various environments.
In quantum federated learning, we first borrow the core idea of federated learning
to propose QuantumFed, a quantum federated learning framework to collaborate
multiple quantum nodes with local quantum data. We conduct simulated
experiments to show the feasibility and robustness of our framework. Then we
extend the Byzantine problem to our QuantumFed framework, examine and
compare how the previously proposed algorithms, FABA, and ToFi, work in the
quantum federated learning framework together with other previous algorithms.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Over the past few decades, machine learning, especially deep learning, has greatly developed in both industry implementation and academic research. It is the main method to
solve artificial intelligence problems by letting machines learn from the experience and
training data to perform supervised learning or unsupervised learning tasks. Most of the
classic machine learning algorithms were proposed in the 1900s, such as Bayes classifier,
logistic regression [20], K-means [66], KNN [19], EM algorithm [23], SVM [18], decision
tree [11,83,88], etc. In 1989, Lecun et al. proposed deep learning in [55] by applying backpropagation [87] in the handwritten zip code digit recognition problem. However, because
of the limitation of the computational power and data [95], and other algorithm problems
such as the vanishing gradient problem [42], deep neural networks did not receive much
attention at that time.
In the early 21st century, with the fast development in the computational power of
the hardware, more people started to focus on using deep learning to solve practical problems. For instance, in computer vision, the success of AlexNet [51] made more people
start to use the convolutional neural network. He et al. proposed ResNet [39] by introducing the residual network to solve the vanishing and exploding gradient problem.
Generative adversarial networks [32] were proposed to generate similar images by learning
from training images, etc. In natural language processing (NLP), Hinton et al. first used
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deep neural networks to understand the human language by computer [40]. Later recurrent neural networks were proposed in NLP area and received much attention [33]. The
transformer [104] was proposed and started the idea of using attention in NLP. Bert [26]
used a similar idea and achieved significant success in beating all kinds of NLP tasks,
etc. There are many other practical tasks that benefit from deep learning, such as the
self-driving vehicle [34, 77, 84], medical diagnoses [5, 58, 99], robotics [59, 73, 81, 100], online
recommendation engines [16, 97, 116, 122], etc.
However, it becomes harder to train a large-scale complicated deep neural network
on a single machine. On one hand, because the physical limits to transistor scaling have
almost been reached and the semiconductor advancement has been gradually slowed below
the predicted pace by Moore’s law, the computational power on a single machine will
have limited growth in the near future [52, 65, 82]. On the other hand, people prefer
to adopt deeper neural networks for better ability to fit the features of the data and
learn complicated tasks, which can improve the performance and generality [4, 74, 93].
A large-scale deeper network usually requires more computational power to conduct the
training, which becomes more difficult for one machine to complete. Therefore, many
large-scale distributed machine learning frameworks were proposed to reduce the demands
of computational resources in one single machine [1, 22, 125].
When working with distributed machine learning, the Byzantine problem happens
naturally in an environment of multiple nodes. Byzantine faults were first investigated
by Lamport et al. in 1982 [54]. Byzantine faults [13, 27] describe a general problem in
distributed computing systems that one or more computing nodes may fail and provide
adversarial or empty computational results where there is imperfect information from the
server side on the failure information. We clarify the general Byzantine problem for centralized distributed machine learning in Figure 1.1. In a centralized distributed computing
system, there is one central server for synchronizing and aggregating the parameters and
n computing nodes for conducting the assigned computations. Byzantine faults happen
when some nodes are attacked or compromised and perform adversarial computations (In
2

Central Server

×

...
Node 1

Node 2
(Byzantine)

Node n

Figure 1.1: General byzantine problem.

Figure 1.1, it is Node 2). They intentionally send malicious information to the central
server or other nodes for a catastrophic failure of the whole system. The Byzantine problem is extremely harmful to the distributed computing system because one Byzantine
failure can destroy the whole system. It is also very common because, with the growth
of the scale of the distributed computing system, the number of the computing nodes increases quickly, and thus the risk of su↵ering attacks is increasing. There is much research
on solving Byzantine problems in the classic distributed computing system [28, 53, 85]. In
this article, we extend the Byzantine problem to the distributed machine learning area
and focus on how to defend against Byzantine attacks in di↵erent scenarios with di↵erent
conditions.

1.1

Problem Definition

Since distributed machine learning is a specific kind of distributed computing system, it
naturally su↵ers the same problem when dealing with multiple computing nodes. Here
we focus on Byzantine problems in centralized distributed machine learning, where there
3

is a central server (parameter server, centralized server) to aggregate all the gradients
and weights that are computed from computing nodes (workers) using their assigned or
local training data. On the node side, some nodes su↵er Byzantine attacks and have a
malicious performance by uploading malicious information to the central server. On the
server side, the central server does not know which node is compromised and therefore
adopts and aggregates all the information uploaded by each node to update the global
model. To mitigate the Byzantine problem, the goal of our work is to design an efficient
and e↵ective algorithm running on the server side. This algorithm keeps the distributed
training process converging to an appropriate and reasonable point even if there are some
Byzantine nodes in the distributed system.
In summary, our work mainly focuses on three di↵erent scenarios:
• Distributed neural networks. The classic distributed neural network is the most
basic and general distributed framework in deep learning. In this scenario, two
conditions are assumed. The first condition is that the dataset of each node is i.i.d.,
which is a common feature of the distributed neural network because the dataset in
each node is randomly assigned by the central server from the whole dataset. The
other condition is that the number of Byzantine nodes will not exceed half of the
number of total nodes. This condition is a universal and reasonable assumption in the
classic Byzantine problem because the server is not able to distinguish the uploaded
information between the honest nodes and Byzantine nodes if more than half of the
nodes are under attack from malicious attackers. Otherwise, the Byzantine nodes
can take over the whole training process. We first solve Byzantine problems in the
distributed neural network environment.
• Federated learning. Federated learning is a special kind of distributed machine
learning with two major di↵erences from the classic distributed machine learning.
The first one is that the distribution of the dataset in each node may be di↵erent.
In federated learning, we usually let each node in the system keep its private dataset
4

to maintain users’ privacy. Therefore, the dataset in each node can be significantly
di↵erent from the dataset of other nodes and thus is non-i.i.d. The second di↵erence
comes from the architecture setting of federated learning. In each synchronization
round, the central server in the federated learning system only randomly selects a
small portion of total nodes to perform the computation and only aggregates the
results uploaded by the participating nodes in this round. Therefore, although we
can still assume that more than half of the nodes in the system are honest, we cannot
guarantee that the number of honest nodes is the majority in each round. It is still
possible that more than half of the nodes are attacked in some rounds. Our second
project aims to solve the Byzantine problems in a federated learning environment
with the above two di↵erences.
• Quantum federated learning. Quantum computing has been greatly developed
over the last several decades. It uses superposition, entanglement, and other quantum properties to perform the computation and can achieve quantum supremacy in
some specific tasks. To combine quantum computing and deep neural networks and
use quantum properties to accelerate the performance of deep neural networks, quantum deep learning is proposed, which uses quantum bit as perceptron and unitaries
as weight in classic deep learning to feedforward the network. However, because
of the no-cloning theory of quantum states, it is impossible to perfectly copy the
quantum data from one quantum computer to another. Therefore, a collaborative
training method is needed to train a global model with the quantum data in multiple quantum devices. In the third project, we propose a quantum federated learning
framework, which helps collaborate multiple quantum machines to train a global
quantum deep learning model. Moreover, we extend the Byzantine problems in the
quantum scenario and examine how the previously proposed algorithms work to
defend against Byzantine problems in quantum federated learning.
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1.2

Our Contributions

In this dissertation, we aim to address Byzantine problems in the previous two scenarios.
Our contributions are:
• For Byzantine problems in distributed neural networks, we first propose FABA: a
fast aggregation algorithm against Byzantine attacks. FABA is an efficient algorithm and uses the distance information of the uploaded gradients to remove the
outlier gradients. In addition, for large-scale distributed neural networks with a
great number of nodes, we propose VBOR: a variance based outlier removal algorithm. VBOR simply uses basic statistics metrics and can get comparable results in
O(n) time with others. We provide theoretical proof to show the convergence and
correctness of our algorithms. We also provide empirical results to present the e↵ectiveness and efficiency of our algorithms in di↵erent kinds of distributed environment
settings.
• Because the scenario of Byzantine problems in federated learning is more difficult
to solve perfectly, we introduce an auxiliary tool called reference dataset to defend
against Byzantine attacks. We first systematically compare the di↵erences and difficulties in solving Byzantine problems in federated learning and propose a reference
dataset-based naive algorithm. We show the theoretical e↵ectiveness of the naive
algorithm. Then, we propose our self-adaptive algorithm ToFi: a reference datasetbased two-filter algorithm. ToFi includes two major components: a loss-based filter
and an update similarity-based filter. In our experiment, we create two di↵erent
types of heterogeneous federated learning environments to simulate di↵erent scenarios. The experiment results show that our ToFi algorithm outperforms any other
existing Byzantine-resilient algorithms.
• In order to collaborate multiple quantum machines and train the global model with
data from di↵erent devices, we first propose a general quantum federated learning
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framework QuantumFed. The central server aggregates the update unitary as the
local model training information to update the global model by iteratively applying
the local unitary. We show that our framework is suitable for both updating models by unitaries and gradient descent. The experiment on the simulated quantum
environment shows the feasibility and robustness of the QuantumFed framework for
di↵erent quantum neural network models. Besides, QuantumFed also faces a similar
Byzantine threat when conducting multiple devices. We transform our proposed
algorithm FABA and ToFi in quantum form and use the simulated quantum Byzantine environment to examine our modified algorithms and show similar performance
as in the classic federated learning scenario.

1.3

Dissertation Organization

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of defending
against Byzantine problems in classic distributed machine learning. We then propose
FABA for efficient defenses and VBOR for large-scale distributed machine learning with
a large number of computing nodes. Chapter 3 extends Byzantine problems to federated
machine learning. We compare the major di↵erences between distributed environment
settings and propose ToFi to e↵ectively defend Byzantine attacks in federated learning
scenario. Chapter 4 discusses the distributed problem in quantum deep learning. We
propose a feasible and robust quantum federated learning framework QuantumFed and
compare the performance di↵erence in Byzantine QuantumFed environment using modified Byzantine-resilient algorithm FABA and ToFi. We conclude our work in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2

Defenses against Byzantine
Attacks in Distributed Deep
Neural Networks
2.1

Introduction

Nowadays, it is a trending idea in the machine learning area to make the neural networks
deeper and more complex for better accuracy and generality [4]. Many complicated neural
networks are proposed recently. For instance, Christian et al. proposed GoogLeNet, which
includes more than four million parameters in a 22-layer convolutional neural network
(CNN). ResNet152, proposed by Kaiming et al., is a 152-layer residual neural network,
has been widely used in practice [44]. In ImageNet [43], ResNet152 can perform better
than the accuracy of human beings. The winning team of ImageNet competition 2016 built
a 1207-layer neural network. However, due to the computational power limit, training such
a complicated neural network usually takes a lot of time. Besides, people always need to
tune the hyperparameter to compare for the best performance, which makes the training
process more time-consuming. Although hardware development makes the training faster
by implementing GPU and TPU [76] in practice, it is still relatively a long time. On the
8

other hand, a larger batch size usually helps for stable, fast, and generalized training [46].
Because of the memory limit, we cannot train a very deep neural network with large batch
sizes. To maximize the batch size, we can either use a very large memory that may cost
much more or change the training process.
There has been a lot of research to solve this problem, among which the most practical
one is a technology called distributed machine learning [1, 22]. Like the classic distributed
system, distributed machine learning usually includes one parameter server, which receives
the gradients information from each worker, aggregate the results and synchronize the
updated model and assign the datasets to every worker, and several workers, which have
a copy of the model in one iteration, compute the gradients on their assigned dataset
and upload the computation results to parameter server. There are two advantages of
distributed machine learning. Firstly, it can reduce the computation time significantly. In
the training process of neural networks, we always use stochastic gradient descent, which
usually contains lots of matrix computation. With many workers, we can distribute the
computations to each worker and save time. Secondly, we can use a large batch size in one
iteration to improve training stability and generality without memory concern. The batch
size is the number of training samples to work through before the model’s parameters are
updated. When the batch size is large, each worker will be assigned only a small portion
of training samples. This will relieve the usage of memory and help for better training
results.
Similar to most distributed systems, distributed machine learning may also su↵er
attacks from malicious workers. For example, some workers may be compromised or
have hardware failures and then just upload completely wrong gradients.

Then the

whole training process will converge to a malicious model. Besides, right now more
work focus on implementing distributed machine learning on the edge computing environment [37, 101, 118, 119] so that we can efficiently o✏oad computational power [102] to
more flexible and widely distributed devices and improve data privacy [68]. However, this
environment includes many servers from unknown sources that are not always trustworthy.
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This will also lead wrong gradients attacks. We call this kind of attack Byzantine attacks
in distributed machine learning. There are many existing works in this area. Byzantine
problem was first proposed by [54] in a conventional distributed system. In 2017, Blanchard et al. first explored Byzantine problems in synchronous distributed machine learning
area [9]. They talked about these failures and proposed an original method called Krum.
Krum defines an algorithm based on k closest gradients to give score to uploaded gradients from each worker and selects the gradient with the lowest score as the aggregation
results. Then they also explore the Byzantine problem in asynchronous distributed system [21]. Following works are usually based on median methods such as coordinate-wise
median [120], batch normalized median [15], ByzantineSGD [2]. However, both median
based methods and Krum have a common weakness. They lose a lot of gradient information to keep the convergence and correctness of the training. For example, in Krum, it only
selects one gradient out of all uploaded gradients as the aggregation result. Apparently,
the algorithm loses lots of information because we simply discard most of the gradients.
Accordingly, it has almost no improvement compared to training on a single machine even
though multiple machines are used for distributed computation. Furthermore, although
Krum gives an excellent convergence proof, its assumptions are too strong to satisfy in
reality. Other aggregation methods on the server side are either too complicated or too
slow to resist Byzantine attacks.
In this chapter, we proposed two very efficient algorithms, FABA, and VBOR to
resist Byzantine attacks and solve the problems of slow convergence and complicated algorithms in Byzantine distributed neural networks. FABA is a method that can easily
control the performance by adjusting the choice of hyperparameters, but the time complexity is O(n) where n is the number of workers. VBOR uses the variance to remove
the outliers of uploaded gradients who run with a complexity of O(n) and thus is very
efficient for a large-scale distributed environment, but the performance is not as good as
FABA. This is because VBOR may remove some of the honest gradients, which will a↵ect
the performance. In summary, our contributions are:
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• We proposed two efficient and e↵ective algorithms, FABA and VBOR, which defend
against Byzantine attacks. Our algorithms are very easy to implement and can be
modified in di↵erent Byzantine settings. More importantly, our algorithms are fast
to converge even in the presence of Byzantine workers. FABA can adaptively tune
the performance based on the estimated number of Byzantine workers and VBOR
is efficient in large-scale distributed machine learning scenarios.
• We proved the convergence and correctness of our algorithms based on Bottou’s
online learning structure [10]. Mainly, we proved that the aggregation gradients by
our algorithms are close to the true gradients computed by only the honest workers.
We also proved that the moments of aggregation gradients are bounded by the true
gradients. This ensures that the aggregation gradients are in an acceptable range to
alleviate the influence of the Byzantine workers.
• We simulated the distributed environment with three types of Byzantine attacks by
adding artificial noise to some of the uploaded gradients. We trained LeNet [117] on
MNIST dataset and VGG-16 [96], ResNet-18, ResNet-34, ResNet-50 [44] on CIFAR10 dataset [50] in the Byzantine distributed environment and the normal distributed
environment to compare their results. Experiments showed that our algorithms could
reach almost the same convergence rate as the non-Byzantine cases, with merely one
or two epochs behind. Compared with the Krum and GeoMedian algorithms, our
algorithms are much faster and achieve higher accuracy. Besides, we also compare
FABA and Krum to show the tradeo↵ between accuracy and time complexity.

2.2

Problem Definition and Analysis

In this section, we analyze the Byzantine problem in the distributed deep neural network.
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2.2.1

Problem Definition

In the synchronous distributed neural network, it usually assumes that we have n workers,
worker1 , worker2 , · · · , workern and one parameter server P S, which handles the uploaded
gradients. Each worker keeps a replicated model. In each iteration, each worker trains on
its assigned dataset and uploads the gradients g1 , g2 , · · · , gn to the P S. The P S aggregates
the gradients by average or other methods and then sends back the updated weights to
all the workers as follows:

wt+1 = wt

Here wt and

t

t A(g1 , g2 , · · ·

, gn )

(2.1)

are respectively the model weights and learning rate at time t. A(·) is

an aggregation function that is usually an average function in classic distributed neural
networks. Lastly, gi is the uploaded gradient. The Byzantine faults may occur when some
workers upload their gradients. These workers upload poisonous gradients that could be
caused by malicious attacks or hardware computation errors, which means the uploaded
gradient gi may not be the same as the actual gradient gi . We call the worker who conducts
Byzantine faults as Byzantine workers. The generalized Byzantine model that is defined
in [9] is:
Definition 1 (Generalized Byzantine Model)

(gi )j =

8
>
>
<(gi )j

>
>
:arbitrary

if j-th dimension of gi is correct

(2.2)

otherwise

As most of previous literature [9, 120], we assume that there are at most ↵ · n Byzantine
workers in this distributed system where ↵ < 0.5. Similar to [9], we also assume that
Byzantine attackers have full knowledge of the entire system. If not, uploaded gradients
from Byzantine workers are di↵erent from honest workers. Any outlier removal techniques
can easily filter those Byzantine workers out.
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2.2.2

Byzantine Cases

First, we discuss some cases where Byzantine faults may happen. In this way, we can
better understand this problem and consider how to defend it.
Some workers are under attack. Assume the index set of the workers attacked is I,
so we have:
gi =

8
>
>
<gi , i 2
/I

>
>
:arbitrary, i 2 I

(2.3)

In this case, only the workers in I may upload wrong gradients, and other workers upload
honestly. Intuitively, if we keep checking the uploaded gradients for sufficient time, all the
Byzantine workers will be detected. Check here means in P S, we do the same computation
as workers do to check if they upload the right gradients. However, in the following
theorem, we show that the check algorithm cannot be determined, otherwise, this scheme
is not Byzantine resilient.
Theorem 1 If the check scheme does not keep checking all the time but checks for some
determined-time, this scheme is not Byzantine resilient.
Proof: Since the Byzantine workers have the full knowledge of the entire system, they
also know when the check will proceed in P S. They only need to upload actual gradients
when the check proceeds. At other times, they can upload anything they want to attack
this system. Because the aggregation function A(·) here is average function, and without
loss of generality, we assume worker1 is attacked, worker1 only need to upload g1 =
n·r

g2

wt+1 = wt

···
tr

gn so that the aggregation result A(g1 , g2 , · · · , gn ) = r. Then from (2.1),
⌅

can be any value.

From Theorem 1, we know that to check Byzantine workers, this scheme must have
random factors so that the attackers cannot get any information before uploading the
gradients. Also, random checks take too much useless computation. This will definitely
decrease the computation speed.
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Dishonest user in Edge or IoT case. In edge or IoT cases, if we want to train a big
model using each user’s private data, a good way to achieve this is distributed training.
However, we cannot ensure the data provided by each user is honest. Some of them may
upload the gradients computed by wrong data or label.
Hardware fault causes computation fault. In most cases, this kind of fault usually
changes the (gi )j to (gi )j by flipping some bits in memory [62]. Actually, this kind of
fault happens pretty rarely in practice (around one per several months). So we can simply
ignore these kinds of faults because this does not have a huge impact. In the worst case,
this makes wt wrong. We can think of this wt as a new initial random weight and start
training again. On the other hand, this fault may help the training jump out of the local
minima. In this way, hardware fault is not a big problem.
Network communication problem. This problem happens when the network is broken
down for some reason. Because this training process is synchronous, if the gradients from
one worker cannot upload normally, all the workers need to stop to wait for it. This is
easy to solve by setting an updating threshold ⌧ . If a worker cannot update after ⌧ , its
value is ignored for this iteration.
There may be other situations where Byzantine faults happen, but the most important
factors are the first two cases. In the next two sections, we will make it clear of our
algorithms to resist Byzantine attacks.

2.3

FABA Algorithm Details

In this section, we will discuss how FABA works and the convergence proof of them.

2.3.1

Overview

We know that if the Byzantine gradients are very close to the average of honest gradients,
the attack has almost no harm. Our proposed method is based on the observation that (i)
most of the honest gradients do not di↵er much, and (ii) attack gradients must be far away
14

from the true gradients in order to successfully a↵ect the aggregation results. Note that
the honest gradients are computed by the average of the mini-batch dataset in each honest
worker. By Central Limit Theorem, as long as the mini-batch size is large enough and the
dataset on each worker is randomly selected, the gradients from di↵erent workers will not
di↵er much with high probability. We propose Algorithm 1 based on these observations.
Algorithm 1 FABA (P S Side)
Input:
The gradients computed from worker1 , worker2 , · · · , workern : Gg = {g1 , g2 , · · · , gn };
The weights at time t: wt ;
The learning rate at time t: t ;
The assumed proportion of Byzantine workers: ↵;
Initialize k = 1.
Output:
The weights at time t + 1: wt+1 .
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

If k < ↵ · n, continue, else go to Step 5;
Compute mean of Gg as g0 ;
For every gradient in Gg , compute the di↵erence between g0 and it. Delete the one
that has the largest di↵erence from Gg ;
k = k + 1 and go back to Step 1;
Compute the mean of Gg as the aggregation result at time t At ;
Update wt+1 = wt
t · At and send back the updated weights wt+1 to each worker.
Algorithm 1 shows that in each iteration the parameter server (P S) discards the out-

lier gradients from the current average. Previous methods such as Krum keep only one
gradient no matter how many Byzantine workers are present, which significantly impacts
the performance. Our algorithm, instead, can easily adjust the number of discarded gradients based on the number of Byzantine workers. That is, the performance will improve
when the number of Byzantine workers is small.

2.3.2

Convergence Guarantee

Next, we show that Algorithm 1 can ensure that the aggregation results are close to the
true gradients. Mathematically, we have Lemma 1.
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Figure 2.1: Uploaded Gradients Distribution

Lemma 1 Denote honest gradients as g1 , g2 , · · · , gm and Byzantine gradients as a1 , a2 , · · · , ak
1 Pm
and m + k = n. Let gtrue = m
gtrue || < ✏ for
i=1 gi . If we assume that 9✏ > 0, ||gi
i = 1, 2, · · · , m. Then after the process from Algorithm 1, the distance between the remaining gradients and gtrue is at most

✏
1 2↵ .

Proof: As Figure 2.1 shows, the blue stars are honest gradients, and the red stars are
Byzantine gradients. gattack is defined as the average of the attack gradients, i.e., gattack =
1 Pk
i=1 ai . Here, gmean is the mean of all uploaded gradients from workers, i.e., gmean =
k
P
Pk
m
1
i=1 ai ). In Figure 2.1, all the blue stars lie in the ball with the center of
n ( i=1 gi +

gtrue and radius of ✏. It is obvious that we can compute gmean , but we do not know the
value of gtrue and gattack .
We first compute the position of gmean . It is apparent that gmean lies on the line
connecting gtrue and gattack . Because the assumption that the proportion of Byzantine
workers is no more than ↵, here we assume that the number of Byzantine workers is
exactly ↵ · n, so gmean = (1

↵) · gtrue + ↵ · gattack . Denote the distance between gtrue and

gattack is l, then the distance between gmean and gtrue is ↵ · l and the distance between
gmean and gattack is (1

↵) · l.

Let us talk about two cases here:
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• If l >

✏
1 2↵ ,

this is equivalent to

↵ · l + ✏ < (1

↵) · l

(2.4)

(2.4) means the gmean gattack is larger than gmean gtrue + ✏.
In the description of Algorithm 1, we are going to delete gradient from one worker
which is farthest from gmean . In this case, because all gradients in the ball are closer
to gmean than ↵ · l + ✏, and as we know, gattack is the average of all attack gradients,
9i 2 {1, 2, · · · , k} s.t.
||ai

gmean ||

||gattack

gmean || > ↵ · l + ✏

(2.5)

(2.5) means in this case, the gradient we delete is from Byzantine worker.
• If l <

✏
1 2↵ ,

we cannot ensure whether gradients that we delete are from Byzantine

workers. However, we can guarantee that if we delete gradients from honest workers,
remaining gradients are no more than

✏
1 2↵

from gtrue , because the gi gmean < ↵·l+✏,

if we delete gradients from an honest worker rather than from a Byzantine worker,
the distance between gradients of Byzantine worker and gmean must be smaller than
↵ · l + ✏. In this case, all remaining gradients are within a ball with the center as
gtrue and the radius as l <

✏
1 2↵ .

Combining these two cases, we have the conclusion that gradients we delete must (i) come
from Byzantine workers or (ii) come from an honest worker, but all remaining gradients
are within

✏
1 2↵

distance to gtrue .

As we repeat this process ↵·n times, if the gradients we delete are only from Byzantine
workers, all gradients remaining are from honest workers. Otherwise, if one of the gradients
we delete is from Byzantine workers, then all remaining gradients are in such a ball as
⌅

described before.

Lemma 1 ensures that aggregation results from uploaded gradients are close to true
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gradients;

✏
1 2↵

is similar to ✏ when ↵ is not very close to 0.5. This intuitively ensures

the convergence of Algorithm 1. But to prove it, next we also need to guarantee that
lower-order moments of aggregation results are limited by true gradients. Theoretically,
we have Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Let aggregation results that we get from Algorithm 1 at time t are At and
denote G as the correct gradients estimator. If we assume ✏ < C · ||G|| while C is a
small constant, for r = 2, 3, 4, E||At ||r is bounded above by a linear combination of terms
E||G||r1 , E||G||r2 , · · · , E||G||rl with r1 + r2 + · · · + rl = r and l  n

d↵ · ne + 1.

Proof: After we proceed Algorithm 1, we delete ↵ ·n gradients; assume that gradients left
are g (1) , g (2) , · · · , g (p) and p = n

d↵ · ne. From Lemma 1, we have ||g (i)

gtrue || 

✏
1 2↵

for i 2 {1, 2, · · · , p}. We know from Algorithm 1 that
p

1 X (i)
||At || = ||
g ||
p

(2.6)

i=1

There are at most ↵ · n attack gradients left here. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the last ↵ · n gradients are from attack workers. By triangle inequality, (2.6) is
bounded by
||At || ||g (1) || + · · · + ||g (p

d↵·ne)

|| + ||g (p

d↵·ne)

||+

d↵·ne+1)

||

+ · · · + ||g (p) ||
||g (1) || + · · · + ||g (p
||gtrue || +

✏

1

2↵

+ · · · + ||gtrue || +

||g (1) || + · · · + ||g (p

d↵·ne)

||+

||gtrue || · d↵ · ne + C1 · ||G||
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✏
1

2↵

So we have
||At ||r  C2

X

r1 +···+rq+1 =r

||gtrue ||rp

||g (1) ||r1 · · · ||g (p

d↵·ne+1

d↵·ne) rp

||

d↵·ne

·

· · · ||gtrue ||rp ||G||rp+1

We make an expectation on both sides and get
E||At ||r  C2

X

r1 +···+rq+1 =r

||G||r1 · · · ||G||rp+1

(2.7)

⌅

Here r = 2, 3, 4 and C1 , C2 are two constants.
Now we have the convergence of Algorithm 1.

Theorem 2 We assume that (i) the cost function cost(w) is three times di↵erentiable
P
with continuous derivatives and non-negative; (ii) the learning rates satisfy t t = 1
P 2
and
t t < 1; (iii) the gradients estimator satisfies EG = rCost(w) and 8r =
2, 3, 4, E||G||r  Ar + Br ||w||r for some constants Ar , Br ; (iv) ✏ < C · ||G|| and C is
a relatively small constant that is less than 1; (v) let ✓ = arcsin (1
surface ||w||2 > D, there exists e > 0 and 0 

<

||rCost(w)||

hw, rCost(w)i
||w|| · ||rCost(w)||

⇡
2

✏
2↵)gtrue ,

beyond the

✓, s.t.

e>0
cos

Then the sequence of gradients rCost(wt ) converges almost surely to 0.
We prove Theorem 2 following the proof in [10]. We use the same online learning
structure to prove the convergence in non-convex settings. Basically, the idea is to first
prove the global confinement of the weight, then we can use this property to prove the
convergence.
Proof:
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This proof follows Bottou’s proof in [10] and the proof of Proposition 2 in the supplementary material of [9] with some modifications.
Condition (v) is complicated, so we use Figure 2.2 to clarify it. The dotted circle

Wt

gtrue

ε

At ε/(1-2α)

ψ
θ

Figure 2.2: Condition (v)

means the ball that all honest gradients lie in. By Lemma 1, At is in the ball whose center
is gtrue and radius is
is less than

while

✏
1 2↵ .

<

⇡
2

This assumption means that the angle between wt and gtrue
✓.

We start by showing the global confinement within the region ||w||  D.
(Global confinement). Let

(x) =

We denote ut = (||wt ||2 ).
Because

8
>
>
<0

>
>
:(x

if x < D
D)2

otherwise

has the property that

(y)

(x)  (y

x) 0 (x) + (y

x)2

We have

ut+1

ut ( 2 t hwt , At i +

2
2
t ||At || )
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·

0

(||wt ||2 )

(2.8)

+4


4

3
2
t hwt , At i||At ||

2 t hwt , At i 0 (||wt ||2 ) +
+4

Denote %t as the

2
2
t hwt , At i

2
2
2
t ||wt || ||At ||

+4

4
4
t ||At ||

+

2
2 0
(||wt ||2 )
t ||At ||

3
3
t ||wt ||||At ||

4
4
t ||At ||

+

-algebra that represents the information in time t. We can get the

conditional expectation as

E(ut+1

ut |%t )



2 t hwt , EAt i +

2
2 0
2
t E(||At || ) (||wt || )

+4

2
2
2
t ||wt || E(||At || )

+4

3
3
t ||wt ||E(||At || )

+

4
4
t E(||At || )

By Lemma 2, there exist positive constants X0 , Y0 , X, Y such that

E(ut+1

ut |%t ) 

2 t hwt , EAt i 0 (||wt ||2 ) +

2
t (X0



2 t hwt , EAt i 0 (||wt ||2 ) +

2
t (X

The first term in the right is 0 when ||wt ||2 < D. When ||wt ||2

+ Y0 ||wt ||4 )

+ Y · ut )
D, because of Figure 2.2,

we have
hwt , EAt i

||wt || · ||EAt || · cos(✓ + ) > 0

So we have
E(ut+1

ut |%t ) 

2
t (X

+ Y · ut )

For the following proof we define two auxiliary sequences µt =
u0t = µt ut .
Because of (2.9), we can move

2
tY

E(u0t+1

(2.9)
Qt

1
1
i=1 1+ i2 Y

· ut to the left and we get
u0t |%t ) 
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2
t µt X

! µ1 and

t!1

Define an indicator function

as

t

t

=

Then we have

8
>
>
<1 E(u0t+1
>
>
:0

E( t (u0t+1

u0t |%t ) > 0

otherwise

u0t ))  E( t (u0t+1


u0t |%t ))

2
t µt X

(2.10)

By the quasi-martingale convergence theorem [71], (2.10) implies that the sequence u0t
converges almost surely, which also implies that ut converges almost surely, that is, ut !
u1 .
If we assume u1 > 0, when t is large enough, we have ||wt ||2 > D and ||wt+1 ||2 > D,
so (2.8) becomes an equality. This means that
1
X
t=1

Since we have

0 (||w

t ||

2)

t hwt , EAt i

0

(||wt ||2 ) < 1

converge to a positive value and in the region ||wt ||2 > D, by the

condition (iv) and (v), we have

hwt , EAt i

p
p

D||EAt || cos(✓ + )
D(||rCost(wt )||

1

✏
2↵

) cos(✓ + )

>0

This contradicts condition (ii). So we have the ut converge to 0, which gives the global
confinement that ||wt || is bounded. As a result, any continuous function of wt is bounded.
(Convergence) Here we are going to show that rCost(wt ) converges almost surely
to 0. First we denote ht = Cost(wt ). If we use first order Taylor expansion and bound
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second order derivatives with K1 , we have

|ht+1

ht + 2 t hAt , rCost(wt )i| 

2
2
t ||At || K1

a.s.

This implies that

E(ht+1

ht |%t ) 


2
2
t E(||At || |%)K1

2 t hEAt , rCost(wt )i +

(2.11)

2
t K 2 K1

This also shows that
E( t (ht+1

ht )) 

2
t K2 K1

By the quasi-martingale convergence theorem, ht converges almost surely, that is, Cost(wt ) !
Cost1 . If we move the negative part to the left, take expectation of both sides and sum
them for t, we get

1
X
t=1

t hEAt , rCost(wt )i

<1

a.s.

Next we denote ⇢t = ||rCost(wt )||2 . If we use first order Taylor expansion and bound
second order derivatives with K3 , we have

⇢t+1

⇢t 

2 t hAt , r2 Cost(wt ) · rCost(wt )i +

2
2
t ||At || K3

Taking conditional expectation of both side and bounding the second derivatives by K4 ,
we have
E(⇢t+1

⇢t |%t )  2 t hEAt , rCost(wt )iK4 +

2
t K2 K3

This implies that

E( t (⇢t+1

⇢t ))  2 t hEAt , rCost(wt )iK4 +

2
t K2 K3

By the quasi-martingale convergence theorem, this shows that ⇢t converges almost surely.
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We have

hEAt , rCost(wt )i
(||rCost(wt )||
(1

This implies that

✏

1

2↵

) · ||rCost(wt )||

sin ✓) · ⇢t

1
X
t=1

t

· ⇢t < 1

a.s.

Because condition (ii) and ⇢t converges almost surely, we have that the sequence ||rCost(wt )||
converges almost surely to 0.
⌅

2.3.3

Remarks

First, in our assumption, we assume ✏ < C · ||G|| and C is a relatively small constant.
This condition guarantees that all the gradients from the honest workers gather together
and their di↵erence is small. This condition is easy to satisfy when the dataset that each
worker gets is uniformly chosen and the batch size is not very small. In most cases that
distributed training implements, the dataset is given by the P S and each worker gets
one slice of the entire dataset, thus it is almost uniformly distributed. However, in other
distributed training scenarios, such as di↵erent workers keeping their own secret datasets,
the distribution of the datasets is unknown. As a result, each dataset can be biased, and
thus condition (iv) is not necessarily satisfied. We leave this for future work.
Second, we proved that the remaining gradients processed after Algorithm 1 is within
✏
1 2↵

to the true average gradient in Lemma 1, so after taking the average, the aggregation

results are also within

✏
1 2↵

to it. Note that each honest worker is within ✏ distance

and each honest worker can get convergence on their own. This intuitively shows the
correctness of our algorithm. In fact, if the Byzantine worker ratio is less than
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1
4,

this

radius becomes 2✏. If the ratio is less than 18 , this radius is 43 ✏. This is very close to ✏. In
practice, the ratio of Byzantine workers is usually not high, which means our algorithm
has good performance in these scenarios.
Third, if we combine the first two remarks and ✓ = arcsin (1

✏
2↵)gtrue ,

✓ must be small

here. In Figure 2.2, we know that condition (v) ensures that the angle between wt and
gtrue is less than a fixed

that

<

⇡
2

✓. Since the value of ↵ and condition (iv)

guarantee that the ✓ is small, condition (v) is easy to satisfy. This is di↵erent from the
assumption of Krum. In fact, their assumptions are difficult to satisfy because the radius
of the circle is too large since it is related to the number of the dimensions in weights. In
our algorithm, condition (v) becomes similar to condition (iv) in Section 5.1 in [10], which
guarantees that beyond a certain horizon, the update terms always move wt closer to the
origin on average.
In the end, our algorithm keeps (1

↵)n gradients to aggregate. This maintains more

information than previous methods. Moreover, in practice, if we do not know the number
of Byzantine workers, we can simply change the number of iterations adaptively in Algorithm 1 to test whether we have the right estimate. In the beginning, we can choose a
small ↵ for better performance. When it seems to have more Byzantine workers, correspondingly we can increase ↵ to tolerate more Byzantine attacks. This can be done during
the training process, making it more flexible to balance the tradeo↵ between performance
and correctness. Besides, we can fix the ↵ = 0.5. This can make the aggregation always
correct.

2.4

VBOR Algorithm Details

In this section, we will discuss how VBOR works and the convergence proof of them.
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2.4.1

Overview

While FABA is a fast and efficient algorithm, we need to compute the average after deleting
each farthest gradient. Thus the time complexity easily reaches O(n2 ). Since we need to
do it during every iteration in the training process, this time complexity cannot be ignored.
On the other hand, in some practical implementations, such as edge computing or internet
of things applications [60], there may be a lot of end devices running as workers. In this
scenario, the n here can be really large, causing the time consumption of FABA to a very
high level. To reduce the time complexity to constant, in this subsection, we propose
an alternative VBOR algorithm, which can save a lot of time and defend the Byzantine
attackers. We describe Algorithm 2 below.
Algorithm 2 VBOR (P S Side)
Input:
The gradients computed from worker1 , worker2 , · · · , workern : Gg = {g1 , g2 , · · · , gn };
The weights at time t: wt ;
The learning rate at time t: t .
Output:
The weights at time t + 1: wt+1 .
Compute the standard deviation and mean value µ for all the gradients in Gg ;
Initialize an empty set Gnew ;
3: For every gradient in Gg , if kgi
µk  , add gi to Gnew ;
4: Compute the mean of Gnew as the aggregation result at time t At ;
5: Update wt+1 = wt
t · At and send back the updated weights wt+1 to each worker.
1:
2:

The idea of Algorithm 2 is to take advantage of the mean value and the standard
deviation and use them to limit the range of the uploaded aggregation results. In each
iteration, we limit the distance from the aggregation result and the sample average by
the sample standard deviation. Although this sample includes both honest gradients and
Byzantine gradients, in the following subsection, we can prove that the aggregation results
from VBOR can be close to the true gradients and show the convergence of our algorithm.
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2.4.2

Convergence Guarantee

Similar to the convergence guarantee of FABA, the key of our proof is to bound the
aggregation results from the expectation of the true gradient. Then we can use the online
learning structure to prove the convergence. The idea of our proof also follows this idea.
First, we work on the easy problem, i.e., that there is only one Byzantine worker. This
can help us better understand this algorithm and extend it to multiple Byzantine workers’
cases. To make this convergence guarantee clear, first, we show that if the gradient that
Byzantine worker uploads is bounded by the standard deviation from the average, the
influence on the aggregation result is bounded and small. Theoretically, we have the
following lemma:
Lemma 3 Assume worker1 is Byzantine worker and others are normal workers, i.e.,
P
P
g1 = g1 + , gi = gi for i = 2, · · · , n. Denote g = n1 ni=1 gi , ga = n1 ni=1 gi , and is the

standard deviation vector for g1 , · · · , gn , i.e., the vector of standard deviations for each
dimension. If kg1
kg1

gk  k k for each dimension and kg1

ga k is bounded by ✏, then

ga k is bounded.

Proof: We have:
kg1

gk 

(2.12)

Denote g1 = g1 + and the standard deviation vector of the correct workers g1 , g2 , · · · , gn
is . Here we prove for one dimension case. Higher dimension cases are similar. (2.12)
can be rewritten as:


=

kg1 +
(ga + )k
n
r
2
(g1 +
g) + (g2
r

2

+ 2(g1

g)2 + · · · + (gn
n
n 1 2
ga ) +
n
n2
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g)2

Denote

= g1

ga , previous inequality is equivalent to:

(

+

n

1
n

)2 

2

+2

+

n

n

1

2

n2

So we can derive:

(

p
(n

1)(n
n

2)

1)(n
n

2)

r

n
n

2 2
) 
1

n
n

2
k
1

2

+

1

2

n

1

which is equivalent to:

k

p
(n

r

This means:
k kk
In the end, let ⌘ = p

n
n

k+ p
1
(n

n
,
(n 1)(n 2)

kg1

n
1)(n

is bounded, kg1

2

r

2

+

+

1
n

2

1

1
n

2

1

we have:

ga k  k k + k k
2n 1
k
k+⌘
n 1

Since

2)

r

r

2

+

1
n

2

1

(2.13)
⌅

ga k is bounded.

With the help of Lemma 3, we can extend this bound between aggregation results
and expectation of the true gradients to multiple Byzantine worker cases. Theoretically,
we have Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 Assume worker1 , · · · , workerk are Byzantine workers and others are normal
workers, i.e., gi = gi +

i

for i = 1, 2, · · · , k, gi = gi for i = k + 1, · · · , n. If kgi

for each dimension and kgi

ga k is bounded by ✏ for i = 1, 2, · · · , k, then kgi

bounded.
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gk  k k
ga k is

Proof: Denote

i

= gi

(i)

ga for i = 1, 2, · · · , n and ga = (g1 + · · · + gi

1

+ gi + gi+1 +

· · · + gk + gk+1 + · · · + gn )/n for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. From Lemma 3, we know that:
kgi
If we denote

m

kgi

ga(i) k

2n 1
k
n 1

ik

+⌘

r

2

+

1
n

2
i

1

(2.14)

= maxi k i k, from triangle inequality, we have:
ga k kgi
k

2n
n

+k
k

2n
n

ga(i) k + kga(i) ga k
r
1
1
2
2+
ik + ⌘
1
n 1 i
1 + · · · + i 1 + i+1 + · · · + k
k
n
r
1
1
1
2 + kn
2+
ik + ⌘
i
1
n 1
n

mk

Without loss of generality, we assume l = arg maxi i , then we have:

kgl

2n 1
ga k  k
n 1

lk

+⌘

r

2

+

1
n

1

+⌘

r

2
l

+k

2

+

n

1
n

lk

From triangle inequality, we have:
2n 1
gl k kgl ga k + k
n 1
n 1
+k
lk
n

kgl

lk

1
n

1

2
l

(2.15)

(2.15) is equivalent to:
2n 1
k l k n(k l k + k
n 1
r
3n 2
=k
lk + ⌘
n 1
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lk
2

+⌘

+

r

1
n

1

2

+
2
l

1
n

1

2)
l

(2.16)

From the definition of l, we know that k i k < k l k for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. Then we have:
kgi

Since

i

and

l

ga k kgi

gi k + kgi

ga k = k i k + k i k
r
3n 2
1
2+k
2+
k
lk + ⌘
n 1
n 1 l
r
4n 3
1 2
2+
k
✏k + ⌘
✏
n 1
n 1

are bounded, kgi

ga k is bounded.

ik

(2.17)
(2.18)
⌅

Because ga is an unbiased estimate of EkGk, while G is the distribution of the correct
workers’ gradient, from Lemma 4, we know that as long as a worker’s uploaded gradients
are bounded, no matter whether it is Byzantine, the distance between these gradients to
EkGk is also bounded.
Lemma 5 We choose the average function as A(·) to make aggregation, and it satisfies
all the conditions from Lemma 4, if there exists a constant C > 0, s.t. ✏ < C · ga , then we
have for r = 2, 3, 4, EkAkr is bounded by a linear combination of EkGkr1 , · · · , EkGkrm
with r1 + · · · + rm = r.
Proof: We have:
1
kAk = k (g1 + · · · + gk + · · · + gn )k
n
By triangle inequality,
1
k
(kg1 k + · + kgn k) + ✏
n
n
1X
kC

kgi k +
kga k
n
n

kAk 

i

So we have:
kAkr  C0

X

r1 +···+rn+1 =r

kg1 kr1 · · · kgn krn kga krn+1

for proper constant C0 . This implies EkAkr is bounded by a linear combination of
Ekg1 kr1 · · · Ekgn krn Ekga krn+1 = EkGkr1 · · · EkGkrn EkGkrn+1 with r1 + · · · + rn+1 = r. ⌅
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From Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, similar to the proof of FABA, we have the following
Theorem 3 to ensure the convergence.
Theorem 3 We assume that (i) the cost function cost(w) is three times di↵erentiable
P
with continuous derivatives and non-negative; (ii) the learning rates satisfy t t = 1
P 2
and
t t < 1; (iii) the gradients estimator satisfies EG = rCost(w) and 8r =

2, 3, 4, E||G||r  Ar +Br ||w||r for some constants Ar , Br ; (iv) ✏ < C ·||G|| and C is a relaq
3
2 + 1 ✏2 )/g
tively small constant that is less than 1; (v) let ✓ = arcsin (k 4n
✏k
+
⌘
true ,
n 1
n 1
beyond the surface ||w||2 > D, there exists e > 0 and 0 
||rCost(w)||

hw, rCost(w)i
||w|| · ||rCost(w)||

<

⇡
2

✓, s.t.

e>0
cos

Then the sequence of gradients rCost(wt ) converges almost surely to 0.

2.4.3

Remarks

Similar to FABA, VBOR is also based on the gradients’ location information. However,
there are several di↵erences.
First, the time complexity of VBOR is O(n), and the time complexity of FABA is
O(n2 ). This does not make a very huge di↵erence when n is small. However, in some
large-scale applications, such as distributed machine learning on edge computing, n can
be relatively large. In this scenario, we still need to do this algorithm in P S in every
iteration. The time di↵erence can be really large.
Second, In VBOR, we also need to assume that all the true gradients are close. As
we talked about in Section 2.3.3, this needs all the assigned datasets satisfying the same
distribution and the mini-batch size in each worker is sufficiently large. This is very easy
to achieve in practice.
Third, the convergence speed in VBOR may not be as good as FABA. In VBOR, we
remove the outliers by the mean and variance value, this makes it very possible to remove
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byzantine gradients along with some gradients that are from the honest workers. Thus,
in one iteration, FABA can keep more information than VBOR, making it converge faster
than VBOR. However, FABA has one more hyperparameter than VBOR: the assumed
proportion of Byzantine workers ↵. We need to manually tune this parameter based on
the estimate of Byzantine workers during the training. Although it is possible to tune it
by designing auxiliary algorithms to help tune this parameter in the training process, it
is not as convenient as VBOR.
In the end, apart from using
c·

as the bound, in VBOR we can also change it to

as the bound to remove the outliers. When the proportion of Byzantine workers

is small, Byzantine workers must make the attack gradients very far away from the true
gradients to successfully a↵ect the training. In this scenario, we can choose a large c value
to accelerate the training process.

2.5

Experiments

In this section, we are going to run our FABA and VBOR in a simulated Byzantine
environment on MNIST dataset [117] and CIFAR-10 dataset [50].
In our experiment, we conduct three di↵erent types of attacks. The first is the
Gaussian attack. We simply generate Gaussian noise as attack gradients and weights.
The second method is wrong labeled attack. We let the label of the Byzantine workers’
data be randomly placed, then the Byzantine worker just normally computes the gradient
and weight, and upload results with wrong labeled data to P S. The last method is
one bit attack. For the uploaded gradient and weight, we only change one dimension of
it with a random value. For the comparison, we compare FABA and VBOR with two
state-of-the-art algorithms: score-based algorithm Krum [9] and median-based algorithm
GeoMedian [120]. In the experiments, we train our model on a distributed environment
with 4 Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080Ti GPUs. In most of the experiments, we set the number
of workers to 8, which means each GPU has 2 workers. We choose LeNet-5 [117] as the
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neural network to train on the MNIST dataset and ResNet-18 [44] as the model to train
on CIFAR-10 dataset. LeNet-5 is trained by an SGD optimizer with 0.5 as momentum
and 0.01 as the learning rate. ResNet-18 is trained by an SGD optimizer with 0.5 as
momentum, 5 ⇥ 10

4

as weight decay, and 0.01 as the learning rate. The batch size for

both neural networks is set to 64. We train all the experiments for 80 epochs.

2.5.1
2.5.1.1

Algorithm Comparison
8-Worker Environment

We compare FABA and VBOR with Krum, GeoMedian, and no Byzantine scenario on
three types of attacks that we described before for both MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset.
We have 8 total workers, among which 2 workers are Byzantine workers. The experiment
results are presented in Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.3: Experiment results of di↵erent algorithms for Gaussian, wrong label and one bit
Byzantine attacks on CIFAR-10 for 8 workers

As we can see from Figure 2.3, FABA and VBOR converge much faster than GeoMedian and Krum, and the performance is more stable. Their performance can almost be
the same or even beat a little bit compared to the no Byzantine case for all three types
of attacks. GeoMedian and Krum can also resist all three types of attacks, but the convergence speed is much slower than our algorithms. For the MNIST dataset, the results
are similar. We can see from Figure 2.4 that FABA and VBOR outperform GeoMedian
and Krum for all kinds of attacks, while GeoMedian has slightly better performance than
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Figure 2.4: Experiment results of di↵erent algorithms for Gaussian, wrong label and one bit
Byzantine attacks on MNIST for 8 workers

Krum.
2.5.1.2

32-Worker Environment

Because of the limitation of the hardware, we cannot deploy an environment with more
workers on CIFAR-10 dataset. Thus we only deploy a 32-worker environment on the
MNIST dataset. Each GPU holds 8 workers. We use the same setting as the 8-worker
environment. This time we changed the number of Byzantine workers to 9. The results
are shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Experiment results of di↵erent algorithms for Gaussian, wrong label and one bit
Byzantine attacks on MNIST for 32 workers

The results from Figure 2.5 are very similar to the 8-worker environment. FABA and
VBOR have better convergence speed and performance than GeoMedian and Krum, while
GeoMedian is slightly better than Krum.
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2.5.2

Byzantine Worker Ratio Comparison

The ratio of Byzantine workers can be very di↵erent. In this section, we are going to
compare the performance change of di↵erent Byzantine worker ratios. We still choose to
deploy on an 8-worker environment for both CIFAR-10 and MNIST dataset. We choose
the number of Byzantine workers to be 1, 2, and 3, which respectively implies the ratio of
Byzantine workers 0.125, 0.25, and 0.375. The performances for the comparison between
FABA, VBOR, and Krum, GeoMedian are similar. So here we only show the performance
of FABA and VBOR for di↵erent Byzantine worker ratios in Table 2.1.

FABA

VBOR

Byzantine ratio
Gaussian
Wrong Label
One Bit
Gaussian
Wrong Label
One Bit

0.125
99.11%
99.07%
98.97%
99.11%
99.09%
98.87%

0.25
99.15%
99.05%
98.73%
99.07%
99.04%
98.64%

0.375
99.09%
99.10%
98.25%
99.13%
99.10%
98.35%

Table 2.1: The best accuracy performance of di↵erent Byzantine worker ratios on di↵erent attacks
for FABA and VBOR

From this table, we can see that as the Byzantine worker ratio increases, for all three
types of attacks, the performance does not vary much. This shows that our algorithms
are capable of defending Byzantine attacks in di↵erent ratios of Byzantine workers.

2.5.3

Time Complexity Comparison

We compare the time complexity for FABA, VBOR, GeoMedian, and Krum on the MNIST
dataset and CIFAR-10 dataset. For MNIST, we use a 32 worker environment with 9
Byzantine workers. For CIFAR-10, we use an 8-worker environment with 2 Byzantine
workers. The time consumption results are presented in Table 2.2.
From Table 2.2, we can see that VBOR is the most efficient algorithm compared to
FABA, Krum, and GeoMedian. When the number of workers is small, VBOR, FABA,
and Krum have similar performance on time consumption. However, when the number
of workers increases, VBOR performs much better than all other algorithms, and FABA
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Algorithm
Gaussian
Wrong Label
One Bit
Gaussian
Wrong Label
One Bit

Krum

GeoMedian
MNIST
11613.7s
23125.2s
12025.3s
24276.2s
11632.4s
24098.5s
CIFAR-10
6291.5s
10112.7s
5762.7s
9893.2s
6663.3s
11863.9s

FABA

VBOR

4447.9s
3697.3s
4008.4s

3214.1s
3264.5s
3333.3s

5245.7s
5188.8s
6080.4s

5164.8s
5343.9s
6036.0s

Table 2.2: The time complexity of di↵erent algorithms on di↵erent attacks for MNIST and
CIFAR-10

has the second-best efficiency performance. GeoMedian is the slowest algorithm because
it adopts an iterative method to find the geometric median.

2.6

Conclusion

As distributed neural networks become much more popular and are being used more
widely, people are beginning to enjoy the efficiency and e↵ectiveness brought by neural
networks. However, we must realize that such networks also have deficits. Neural networks
do help us solve some of the problems that traditional algorithms may take more time
to train or even cannot solve. But on the other hand, people do not know whether the
workers are truthful or not. In most cases, we cannot guarantee that all the workers, to
be honest, so the Byzantine problem in distributed neural network training is severe and
harmful in practice. Once the Byzantine workers take over the entire training process, the
training can become much worse than expected. Therefore, although distributed neural
networks are good in training speed, we should use them with caution.
In this chapter, we proposed two e↵ective outlier deletion-based algorithms to resist
Byzantine attacks in distributed neural networks. We proved the convergence of our
algorithms. In fact, in our algorithms, we can ensure that when the number of Byzantine
workers is small, the rest gradients obtained by our algorithms are very close to the true
gradients. Our algorithms are more efficient because we use as much information as we can
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in all uploaded gradients. We take the average of all the rest gradients and use it as the
aggregated results. This keeps more information than traditional methods that always use
one gradient among all gradients to keep the convergence correct, which, in our opinion,
loses the original idea of distributed training. In practice, we use distributed training
for better convergence speed. If we only use the gradients from one single machine, we
do not need distributed training anymore. Our experiments showed that our algorithms
are e↵ective enough. We deployed our algorithms in a simulated Byzantine environment
on the MNIST dataset and CIFAR-10 dataset. The results exceeded expectations. Our
algorithms can get almost the same speed and accuracy with the baseline results that
there is no Byzantine worker in the same distributed environment, and the results are
much better than previous methods.
In order to eliminate the influence from the Byzantine workers, we started an original
and di↵erent approach from the previous methods. Unlike previous works, our algorithms
do not focus on how to aggregate all the gradients from the workers; it is more complex
and not efficient enough. Our algorithms are based on how to delete the outlier gradients.
FABA is easy to construct and control, making it simple to change how many Byzantine
gradients that we want to delete by changing the parameters through the training process.
VBOR has a smaller time complexity with only a little accuracy loss and also is very easy
to implement. We believe that our easy and original algorithms can be widely used in
distributed neural networks to protect against Byzantine attacks.
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Chapter 3

Defenses against Byzantine
Attacks in Federated Learning
3.1

Introduction

Federated learning [48, 70] is an emerging technology to address privacy and communication drawbacks associated with traditional distributed machine learning. It is always
combined with edge computing for easy implementation [101] and further privacy [111,112]
and communication efficiency improvement [68,69,102]. In order to solve the privacy issue,
in federated learning, we usually assume that each node in the training process keeps its
private dataset [61,123] and only the intermediate computation results will be uploaded to
the P S for the aggregation and model update. In addition, federated learning sometimes
only randomly selects some of the nodes to perform the computation in one synchronization, and meanwhile, each node usually proceeds self-update for several intervals for this
synchronization. This significantly reduces the communication cost between nodes and
the P S. Therefore, federated learning attracts more interests in both academic research
and industry application.
However, because federated learning is a special kind of distributed machine learning,
it naturally subjects to security attacks when communicating with multiple nodes. For ex-
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ample, in classic distributed machine learning, Byzantine problems exist when some nodes
su↵er attacks and do not perform honestly when uploading the computation results to the
P S, thus the whole training process will be dominated by dishonest nodes. This problem
becomes even more severe in federated learning. In federated learning settings, nodes are
from di↵erent resources, among which some are trusted and some can be untrusted. This
is di↵erent from the classic distributed machine learning, where in usual, all the nodes
are in the laboratory environment and are under control. In this scenario, nodes in the
federated learning system are more likely to be attacked or compromised intentionally or
unintentionally. For example, many users collaborate to train an image recognition model.
However, some users just upload a cat picture and mark it as a dog. This user may do it
just for fun or examine the robustness of the model, but this operation apparently a↵ects
the performance of the model training. When the number of such user or activity is large,
the training process will lead to the wrong model.
Although there are some algorithms that work well toward solving Byzantine problems in traditional distributed machine learning, these algorithms do not perform well for
federated learning due to the following two major problems:
• The distribution of the dataset in each node may be di↵erent. Data heterogeneity is
an important feature of federated learning. It by design comes along with the local
data isolation in each node. Because each node can keep its private dataset, the
data distribution between di↵erent nodes may be significantly di↵erent. Therefore
the computational results of each node can be very di↵erent such that it is difficult
to distinguish between honest nodes and Byzantine nodes.
• Honest majority is not a reasonable assumption in federated learning. Byzantine
problems in traditional distributed machine learning areas always have a common
assumption that honest nodes are the majority, which means the number of honest
nodes is more than half of the total nodes. Although we can still make a similar
assumption that the honest nodes are the majority in a federated learning scenario,
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in each synchronization, we cannot assume that there are more honest nodes in the
random selection. For example, we have 100 nodes in total, among which 20 nodes
are malicious. In each synchronization, we randomly choose 10 nodes to do the
computation. It is possible that more than 5 malicious nodes are selected. This
will make all the previous algorithms ine↵ective because malicious nodes can take
over the training. Besides, some of the previous algorithms such as Zeno [115] and
FABA [110] that need to estimate the ratio of Byzantine nodes. In federated learning,
this can change in di↵erent synchronizations, which makes it hard to estimate this
ratio.
In this chapter, we carefully investigate these two challenges of Byzantine problems in
federated learning and propose a naive algorithm and modify it to an efficient algorithm
ToFi to defend against Byzantine attacks. In summary, our contributions are:
• We compare the major di↵erences of Byzantine problems between federated learning
and distributed learning and analyze why previous Byzantine-resilient algorithms do
not work well in federated learning.
• We propose a naive algorithm to solve Byzantine problems in federated learning.
More importantly, we modify it to an efficient two-filter reference dataset-based
algorithm ToFi to efficiently defend against Byzantine attacks in practice.
• We conduct several experiments in various environments to compare ToFi and other
existing algorithms to show our superior performance of defending against Byzantine
attacks in federated learning.

3.2

Related Works

In order to resist Byzantine attacks in classic distributed machine learning, some algorithms have been proposed. Basically, there are three directions for defending against
Byzantine attacks: score-based, median-based, and distance-based algorithms.
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The idea of score-based algorithms is that there is a scoring system on the server
side such that this system assigns corresponding scores for each uploaded gradient. This
is the earliest idea to defend against Byzantine attacks in this area. Blanchard et al.
first proposed an algorithm called Krum [9]. In Krum’s design, each gradient’s score is
based on the summation of the distances to its nearest neighbors. Then the server simply
chooses the gradient with the smallest score as the aggregation result. This gradient has
the property that it is the closest one that nears its neighbors, so it should come from
an honest node with high probability. However, because only one gradient is selected
as the aggregation result, a lot of useful information from other uploaded gradients is
missing. Therefore, the convergence speed of Krum is slow. After this, they also proposed
another algorithm to resist asynchronous Byzantine attacks [21]. In addition, Xie et al.
also proposed methods based on a reference dataset to give scores for each node to solve
fault-tolerance problems in distributed machine learning [114, 115]. Their scoring systems
use the reference dataset to examine the loss of each uploaded gradient and the server
finally chooses the gradients that result in smaller loss.
Later the idea of defending against Byzantine attacks has been moved to the geometric
median-based algorithms. By definition, the geometric median of a discrete set of points in
Euclidean space is a point that minimizes the sum of distances to the sample points. For
example, Xie et al. proposed geometric median, marginal median, and median-aroundmedian [113], Yin et al. proposed coordinate-wised median [120], Lili et al. proposed a
batch normalized median [15], Alistarh et al. proposed a more complicated modification of
median-based methods called ByzantineSGD [2]. The geometric median is an important
estimator of location in statistics and it can preserve the majority location information
of the sample points, which in Byzantine problems, represent more about the honest
update information. Although median-based algorithms usually have better convergence
performance than score-based algorithms, they also have one shortcoming. The geometric
median of several sample points usually needs an iterative method to solve and thus the
computational time is considerable. On the server side, it takes a too long time for the
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aggregation, so the training speed will be slower.
Distance-bases algorithms conduct the distance information to remove the dishonest
gradients. From the i.i.d. dataset and central limit theorem, the honest gradients should
be close to each other. Therefore, in order to defend against Byzantine problems in this
scenario, the problem is transformed to outlier gradient removal based on distance information. Xia et al. proposed an alternative method called FABA [110]. Instead of using
median-based methods, they used Euclidean distance to remove outlier gradients. They
adaptively remove outliers based on the distance between the current average gradient
and the current remaining gradients. They later provided another Byzantine-resilient algorithm for large-scale distributed machine learning [109]. By using simple statistics of
multi-dimensional mean and standard deviation, it can remove the outliers in O(n) time.
It has comparable performance with other algorithms while keeping a fast training speed.

3.3
3.3.1

Preliminary
Federated Learning

Here we give a brief introduction about federated learning, which is a special kind of
the distributed learning. Figure 3.1 is the structure of one synchronization in federated
learning at time t. It has one central server P S and n workers worker1 , · · · , workern . In
each iteration, the P S randomly selects m workers. The selected workers then fetch the
global model from the P S and perform the computation on their local dataset. Without
loss of generality, we assume worker1 to workerm are selected. On the worker side,
those participated workers then update their local model on their private dataset ⇠i . If
we assume the loss function on the neural network is f (·), weights at time t are wt and
learning rate at time t is

t,

stochastic gradient descent will update the local weight for

workeri at time t + 1 as:
i
wt+1
= wt

t

·

@f (w|⇠i )
@w
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wt

(i = 1, 2, · · · , m)

(3.1)

On the P S side, it receives the updated weights uploaded by all the participated workers.
P S uses an aggregation function A(·) to aggregate the uploaded weights and update the
global model.
1
2
m
wt+1 = A(wt+1
, wt+1
, · · · , wt+1
)

(3.2)

In practice, we usually simply use a weighted average function to aggregate the uploaded
weights.
Parameter Sever

Server
Side
Selected Nodes

Node
Side

Unselected Nodes

Worker 1

Worker 2

Data set 1

Data set 2

...

Worker m

Worker m + 1

Data set m

Data set m+1

...

Worker n

Data set n

Figure 3.1: Federated learning with Byzantine attackers at time t

3.3.2

Byzantine Problem

Byzantine problems exist when some workers are attacked or compromised and do not
i
compute or upload weights correctly. In this scenario, the uploaded weights wt+1
in (3.2)
i
may not be the real wt+1
computed by (3.1). Theoretically, the generalized Byzantine

model that is defined in [9, 113] is:
Definition 2 (Generalized Byzantine Model)

i
wt+1
=

8
>
>
<w i

t+1

>
>
i
:ai 6= wt+1

if i-th worker is honest
otherwise
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(3.3)

i
Here we denote wt+1
as the actual weights received by P S from workeri . In each iteration

of the training phase, some workers may become Byzantine workers and upload attack
weights ai to the P S. As we can see in Figure 3.1, worker2 here is a Byzantine attacker.
2
2
It uploads an alternative wt+1
rather than the actual wt+1
to the P S. The P S, at the

same time, does not know worker2 is compromised. It aggregates all the uploaded weights
and sends the incorrectly updated weights back to all workers. According to Theorem 1
in [110], when the aggregation function is an average function, one Byzantine attacker can
take over the aggregation result and lead the whole training process to an incorrect phase.

3.3.3

Discussions about Byzantine Problems in Federated Learning

In the introduction, we have discussed two major di↵erences between traditional distributed machine learning and federated learning. These two di↵erences make it extremely
difficult to solve Byzantine problems in federated learning. For example, if we assume the
number of Byzantine nodes is equal to the number of honest nodes and let Byzantine
nodes have the same data as honest nodes with di↵erent labels, the P S is not able to
distinguish which training results are real. Thus it is not able to solve Byzantine problems
without other information. In addition, when the dataset is not i.i.d. and the computational results are totally di↵erent from each other, it is very hard for the P S to distinguish
between honest results and Byzantine results.
Therefore, in order to solve Byzantine problems in federated learning, more conditions
are needed. Here like [49] and [114,115], we assume that P S holds a small reference dataset
to solve Byzantine problems in federated learning. Our theoretical assumptions are defined
in Section 3.4.

3.4

Problem Definition

Let D stand for the distribution for the whole dataset and Di represents distributions for
di↵erent workers. We first assume that the distributed environment is heterogeneous.
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Assumption 1 (Heterogeneous environment) Updated weights of each worker are
computed based on their private non i.i.d. dataset, i.e.,
i
wt+1
= wt

t

·

@f (w|⇠i )
@w

,
wt

⇠i ⇠ D i

(i = 1, 2, · · · , m)

(3.4)

Here m is the number of selected workers in the federated learning system.
The second assumption is for the Byzantine environment. The Byzantine model is
given by Definition 2.
i
i
Assumption 2 (Byzantine environment) Denote Bt = {i|wt+1
6= wt+1
at iteration t}.

We have: (i) Bt can be di↵erent from each other; (ii) 0  |Bt |  n.
Assumption 2 states two features of Byzantine attacks. On one hand, Byzantine
attacks can target any machine in the distributed system and can change target machines
during the training process. This means that di↵erent sets of workers may be attacked
during di↵erent iterations of the training. On the other hand, there is no upper limit of
the number that Byzantine attacks may happen in one iteration, i.e., in one iteration, it
is possible that the majority of workers su↵er Byzantine attacks.
Assumption 3 (Reference dataset) P S holds a small reference dataset ⇠R such that
⇠R ⇠ D.
Assumption 3 is reasonable because, in practice, P S is usually able to collect some
data. The size of the reference dataset can be very small, for example, 100 to 500 is good
enough, so we can assume P S has a reference dataset.
With these three assumptions, the problem is finding an appropriate aggregation
algorithm A⇤ (·) and using (3.2) to update weights until convergence point wc such that
A⇤ = arg min f (wc )
A(·)
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It is obvious that a simple average is not able to resist Byzantine attacks. Our goal is to
find a Byzantine robust aggregation algorithm in federated learning.

3.5

Algorithm

3.5.1
3.5.1.1

Naive Algorithm
Algorithm Description

Because the P S has no other information about the dataset but only uploaded weights, it
must have some extra information to filter and aggregate weights. The key of our algorithm
is that P S holds a small reference dataset. As this reference dataset has the assumption
that ⇠R ⇠ D, this guarantees that the reference dataset has the same distribution as the
whole dataset and the most information about it. The whole dataset here is a pretty tricky
definition. Since some workers are compromised, their subdatasets are inaccessible by the
P S. This implies that the accessible dataset may only contain part of the whole dataset.
However, we still take the whole dataset as the optimization goal, and the reference dataset
is chosen from this distribution even though some data are hidden by Byzantine attackers.
Because the P S collects reference dataset on its own and P S and all nodes share the same
training goal, it is reasonable to assume there exists such reference dataset. We will use
i
the reference dataset to examine the weights wt+1
uploaded by each worker and aggregate

them to update the weights for each iteration.
The naive algorithm is described in Algorithm 3. Because we do not have access to
each worker, our algorithm is only running on the P S side. In P S, its inputs are the
1 , w 2 , · · · , w m that are computed and uploaded by workers. The output in
weights wt+1
t+1
t+1

one iteration should return the updated weights to all the workers. In Algorithm 3, we
simply minimize the ↵-weighted loss on the reference dataset. Then we use a gradient cap
to limit the projected update gradient. This can help restrict the global model update in
an appropriate range.
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Algorithm 3 Reference dataset based naive algorithm (P S Side)
Input:
Weights computed from worker1 , worker2 , · · · , workerm :
Gw
1 , w 2 , · · · , w m };
{wt+1
t+1
t+1
Gradient cap Gc ;
Learning rate ;
The reference dataset ⇠R .
Output:
Weights at time t + 1: wt+1 .
Pm
i , ⇠ );
1: Solve ↵i by minimizing ↵-weighted loss: ↵i = arg minP ↵i =1 f ( i=1 ↵i wt+1
R
Pm
i
2: Aggregate weights by wt+1 =
i ↵i wt+1 ;
w w
3: Derive the projected gradient gp = t t+1 ;

=

kg k

Get the updated gradient gu = gp / max(1, Gpc );
5: Get the updated weight wt+1 = wt
· gu ;
6: Send back wt+1 to each worker.
4:

Assuming the weights at t + 1 is wt+1 , it should be updated by wt using the ↵-based
weighted average. In each step, we are trying to minimize the loss on the reference dataset
⇠R to get the corresponding ↵i . We have:

arg min f (wt+1 , ⇠R ) = arg min f (
↵i

m
X

i ,⇠ )
↵i wt+1
R

(3.5)

i=1

It should be noted that since ⇠R ⇠ D while D stands for the distribution of the whole
dataset, we can think that f (·, ⇠R ) and f (·, ⇠) are similar. Therefore our goal is going to
minimize (3.5) to compute ↵i .
Let us take a look at the (3.5). In fact,

Pm

i
If we denote each wt+1
as a coordinate in a (m

i
i=1 ↵i wt+1

i .
is a linear combination of wt+1

1)-dimensional space W, then solving ↵i

transforms to finding a point in the space W that minimizes a function f (·|wti , ⇠R ). We
can use several existing techniques to find this minimal point. Grid method is an intuitive
way with slow but e↵ective performance. It divides the space into several grid points and
tries to find a point with the lowest loss function value. However, its time complexity
increases exponentially with the dimension. We can also use the classic gradient descent
to find the optimization solution.
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In addition, we can show the intuition of the correctness of this algorithm. In each
iteration, we are going to choose the best updated direction of the weights on the reference
dataset. Because this direction is an ↵-weighted average of all uploaded weights and it
minimizes the loss function, assuming we have solved ↵i , we have:

f(

m
X
i=1

i , ⇠ )  f (w k , ⇠ )
↵i wt+1
R
t+1 R

(3.6)

This is because ↵i is obtained by minimizing the loss function. We can get (3.6) by setting
(k)

the ↵-weight of wt

to be 1 and all the other ↵-weights to be 0. (3.6) shows that at least

the performance of each iteration on the reference dataset is better than any worker,
including honest workers and Byzantine workers. Mathematically, using the same idea,
we can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6 The ↵-weights that we get from Algorithm 3 Step 1 introduce the smaller loss
on the reference dataset than just ideally taking the average of all the honest weights in
each iteration.
Proof: Without loss of generality, denote the first p workers are honest and the rest
1 , w2 , · · · , wp
are attack workers, i.e., wt+1
t+1
t+1 are true weights from honest workers and
p+1
p+2
m are true weights from dishonest workers. Then the loss of only
wt+1
, wt+1
, · · · , wt+1

taking the average of honest weights losshonest is:
p
X
1

i
wt+1
, ⇠R )

(3.7)

i , ⇠ )  loss
↵i wt+1
R
honest

(3.8)

losshonest = f (

i=1

p

By the definition of ↵-weights, we have:

f(

m
X
i=1

This is because the right of (3.8) is obtained by letting ↵i =

1
p

for i = 1, 2, · · · , p and all

the other ↵i = 0. Since ⇠R ⇠ D, ↵-weighted average has smaller loss in each iteration. ⌅
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We know that even if we only take the weights from one of the honest workers, the
training can still converge to a reasonable model. When we have more workers, although
there are some Byzantine workers, the loss function examination on the reference dataset
and ↵-weighted average can help to get a reasonable model.
3.5.1.2

Convergence Guarantee

In this section, in order to show the di↵erence, we use F (·) to represent the loss function
on the corresponding dataset, i.e., F (w) = f (w, ⇠), Fi (w) = f (w, ⇠i ), FR (w) = f (w, ⇠R ).
We make the following two assumptions in our proof. Assumption 4 is a common
assumption for Lipschitz continuity. Assumption 5 is a little bit di↵erent from the common
assumption of variance bound between rf (w) and rFR (w), but it has the similar meaning
that the angle between them does not vary much almost surely because rF (w) is the
gradient of f (w) in a dataset. They should have a similar direction if the dataset is good
enough.
Assumption 4 f (w) is L-Lipschitz continuous, i.e., |f (x)

f (y)|  L · ||x

y||, 8x, y.

Assumption 5 If we let ⇥(w) equals to the angle between rf (w) and rFR (w), 9✓0 < ⇡2 ,
we have ⇥(w) < ✓0 almost surely.
We can prove the convergence of Algorithm 1 by using the following two lemmas.
Lemma 7 Almost surely, we have 8w, 8✏ > 0, 9 > 0, s.t. 8h < , if g = rF (w) and
em 2 {e, s.t.||e|| = h, F (w
we have 1

e) < F (w

h
g · ||g||
)}, denote ✓ is the angle between g and em ,

cos ✓ < ✏.

Proof: From Assumption 4, we know that F (w) is also L-Lipschitz continuous. Then we
have that F (w) is smooth almost surely. If we use first-order Taylor expansion, we have

F (w

e) = F (w)

hrF (w), ei + o(||e||)
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From the definition of little-o, let g = rF (w), 8✏ > 0, 9 > 0, s.t. 8||e|| < , we have
o(||e||) <

✏||g||
· ||e||
2

Let h < , we have
F (w

hrF (w), em i + o(h)

em ) = F (w)

On the other hand, we have
g
h) = F (w)
||g||

F (w

Because of F (w

em ) < F (w

g
||g|| h),

hrF (w),

hrF (w),

g
hi + o(h)
||g||

we have

g
hi
||g||

hrF (w), em i < 2o(h)

(3.9)

The left of (3.9) is equal to

||g|| · h

||g|| · h · cos ✓ = h · ||g|| · (1

cos ✓)

According to the definition of little-o, we have

h · ||g|| · (1
which is equivalent to 1

cos ✓) < 2 ·

✏||g||
·h
2
⌅

cos ✓ < ✏.

Lemma 7 implies that as long as the step size is small enough and the modified
weight has smaller loss than weight changed by gradients, then this changing direction
and gradient direction can be very close. Lemma 8 uses Lemma 7 and Assumption 5 to
bound the angle between aggregation direction and gradient direction.
Lemma 8 Let EG = rf (w), ḡ =

wt wt+1

, and

arbitrary ✏ > 0 and small enough step size , we have
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is the angle between EG and ḡ, for
< ✓0 + arccos(1

✏) almost surely.

(r)

wt w i

t+1
Proof: Denote g = rF (w) and gi =
, first we would like to show that for some
P
(r)
appropriate ↵i , g = m
i ↵i gi . This is easy to show because ⇠ only contains the data that

comes from the honest workers. Let ↵i = 0 for those dishonest worker and let ↵i equals
P
(r)
to the proportion of ⇠i for worker i, from the definition of g, we have g = m
i ↵i g i .
P
Pm
(r)
i
We can solve ↵i by ↵i = arg min↵i F ( m
i=1 ↵i wt+1 ) = arg min↵i F (w
i ↵i gi ),
Pm
(r)
it is obvious that F (w
g). From Lemma 7, we know that for
i ↵i gi )  F (w
any ✏, when

is small enough, we have 1

coshḡ, gi < ✏.

On the other hand, from Assumption 5, we know that the angle between EG and g
is smaller than ✓0 almost surely, then we have

< ✓0 + arccos(1

✏)
⌅

With Lemma 8, similar to conditions in [9], we can use the general online gradient
algorithm structure [10] and the following conditions to prove the convergence of this naive
algorithm.
Theorem 4 We assume that (i) the loss function f (w) is three times di↵erentiable with
P
continuous derivatives and non-negative; (ii) the learning rates satisfy
t t = 1 and
P 2
2
< ⇡2 ✓0 ,
t t < 1; (iii) beyond the surface ||w|| > D, there exists e > 0 and 0 
s.t.

||rf (w)||

hw, rf (w)i
||w|| · ||rf (w)||

e>0
cos

Then the sequence of gradients rf (wt ) converges almost surely to 0.
Proof: Denote At =

wt wt+1

as the projected aggregation gradient.
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Condition (iii) is complicated, so we use Figure 3.2 to clarify it. EG is actually

Figure 3.2: Explanation of Condition (iii)

rf (w). By Lemma 8, almost surely, the angle between EG and At is at most ✓0 + ✏0
while as long as the step size
that

t

is small enough, ✏0 is small enough. Let ✓1 = ✓0 + ✏0 such

+ ✓1 < ⇡2 . This assumption means that the angle between wt and EG is less than

while

<

⇡
2

✓1 .

We start by showing the global confinement within the region ||w||  D.
(Global confinement). Let

(x) =

We denote ut = (||wt ||2 ).
Because

8
>
>
<0

>
>
:(x

if x < D
D)2

otherwise

has the property that

(y)

x) 0 (x) + (y

(x)  (y

x)2

We have

ut+1

ut  ( 2 t hwt , At i +
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2
2
t ||At || )

·

0

(||wt ||2 )

(3.10)

+4

2
2
t hwt , At i

3
2
t hwt , At i||At ||



2 t hwt , At i 0 (||wt ||2 ) +

+4

2
2
2
t ||wt || ||At ||

4

+4

+

4
4
t ||At ||

2
2 0
(||wt ||2 )
t ||At ||

3
3
t ||wt ||||At ||

4
4
t ||At ||

+

Denote %t as the -algebra that represents the information in time t and we have ||At || 
Gc . Let Ac = max(G2c , G4c ). We can get the conditional expectation as
E(ut+1

ut |%t ) 

2 t hwt , EAt i + Ac (

2 0
2
t (||wt || )

+4

2
2
t ||wt ||

+4

3
t ||wt ||

+

4
t)

Therefore, there exists positive constants X, Y such that

E(ut+1

2 t hwt , EAt i 0 (||wt ||2 ) +

ut |%t ) 

2
t (X

The first term in the right is 0 when ||wt ||2 < D. When ||wt ||2

+ Y · ut )

D, because of Figure 3.2,

we have
hwt , EAt i

||wt || · ||EAt || · cos(✓1 + ) > 0

So we have
E(ut+1

ut |%t ) 

2
t (X

+ Y · ut )

For the following proof we define two auxiliary sequences µt =
u0t = µt ut .
Because of (3.11), we can move

2
tY

E(u0t+1
Define an indicator function

t

t

u0t |%t ) 

8
>
>
<1 E(u0t+1
>
>
:0

Qt

1
1
i=1 1+ i2 Y

· ut to the left and we get
2
t µt X

as

=

(3.11)

otherwise
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u0t |%t ) > 0

! µ1 and

t!1

Then we have
E( t (u0t+1

u0t ))  E( t (u0t+1


u0t |%t ))

2
t µt X

(3.12)

By the quasi-martingale convergence theorem [71], (3.12) implies that the sequence u0t
converges almost surely, which also implies that ut converges almost surely, that is, ut !
u1 .
If we assume u1 > 0, when t is large enough, we have ||wt ||2 > D and ||wt+1 ||2 > D,
so (3.10) becomes an equality. This means that
1
X
t=1

Since we have

0 (||w

t ||

2)

t hwt , EAt i

0

(||wt ||2 ) < 1

converge to a positive value and in the region ||wt ||2 > D, by the

condition (iii), we have

hwt , EAt i

p

D||EAt || cos(✓1 + ) > 0

This contradicts condition (ii). So we have the ut converge to 0, which gives the global
confinement that ||wt || is bounded. As a result, any continuous function of wt is bounded.
(Convergence) Here we are going to show that rf (wt ) converges almost surely to 0.
First we denote ht = f (wt ). If we use first order Taylor expansion and bound second order
derivatives with K1 , we have

|ht+1

ht + 2 t hAt , rf (wt )i| 

2
2
t ||At || K1

a.s.

This implies that

E(ht+1

ht |%t ) 

2 t hEAt , rf (wt )i +
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2
2
t E(||At || |%)K1

(3.13)



2
t K2 K1

This also shows that
ht )) 

E( t (ht+1

2
t K2 K1

By the quasi-martingale convergence theorem, ht converges almost surely, that is, f (wt ) !
f1 . If we move the negative part to the left, take expectation of both sides and sum them
for t, we get

1
X
t=1

t hEAt , rf (wt )i

< 1 a.s.

Next we denote ⇢t = ||rf (wt )||2 . If we use first order Taylor expansion and bound
second order derivatives with K3 , we have

⇢t+1

⇢t 

2 t hAt , r2 f (wt ) · rf (wt )i +

2
2
t ||At || K3

Taking conditional expectation of both side and bounding the second derivatives by K4 ,
we have
E(⇢t+1

⇢t |%t )  2 t hEAt , rf (wt )iK4 +

2
t K2 K3

This implies that

E( t (⇢t+1

⇢t ))  2 t hEAt , rf (wt )iK4 +

2
t K2 K 3

By the quasi-martingale convergence theorem, this shows that ⇢t converges almost surely.
We have

hEAt , rf (wt )i
This implies that

1
X
t=1

t

cos(✓1 + ) · ||rf (wt )||

· ||rf (wt )|| < 1
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a.s.

Because condition (ii) and ⇢t converges almost surely, we have that the sequence ||rf (wt )||
converges almost surely to 0.
⌅
Theorem 4 guarantees the convergence of this naive algorithm. Since the choice of
↵-weights is based on the reference dataset which we believe is a dataset that has the
most information of the whole dataset, the ↵-weighted average aggregation will go to a
better step in each iteration of the whole training process. The idea is similar to the
stochastic gradient descent. In each step, we are going to minimize the current loss from
the information we can get. From Lemma 6, we know that at least in each step, our
performance is better than the ideal case that we can exactly pick those honest workers
and only use the information from those workers. So ideally, the naive algorithm can
converge to a better point than just taking the honest information.

3.5.2
3.5.2.1

ToFi Algorithm
Algorithm Description

With the help of the reference dataset, the naive algorithm can defend against Byzantine
attacks. However, this naive solution is hard to implement in practice. First of all, this
method relies too much on the reference dataset. Therefore, it is more like searching
minimal points on the space of the reference dataset using the computation weight projections from the local dataset to this space. Secondly, this naive method is lacking in
solving the case that in some iterations, all of the participated nodes are attacked and
become malicious. Thirdly, it is time-consuming to solve the optimization problem in each
synchronization.
In order to mitigate these problems, we modify the naive algorithm to our reference
dataset-based two-filter algorithm ToFi. The core ideas of ToFi are below. First, in order
to approximate the ↵-weight in the naive algorithm, we adopt the softmax function of the
examined loss on the reference dataset for each worker so that the worker with a smaller
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loss will get a larger ↵-weight. Second, in order to deal with the abnormal loss received by
the P S, we adopt two filters based on the normalized loss and update similarity to remove
outlier updates. The details of our enhanced algorithm are described in Algorithm 4.
Let us take a look at Algorithm 4. It is an adaptive way to compute the aggregated
weight in a naive algorithm. In summary, there are two filters: reference dataset-based
loss filter and update similarity-based filter. Those filters are designed to remove outlier
weights. The detailed discussions are below.
Algorithm 4 ToFi Algorithm (P S Side)
Input:
1 , w 2 , · · · , w m };
Weights computed from worker1 to workerm : Gw = {wt+1
t+1
t+1
Weights at time t, t 1: wt , wt 1 ;
Learning rate at time t, t 1: t , t 1 ;
Reference dataset ⇠R ;
Predefined loss filter parameter ⌧ ;
Predefined similarity filter parameter ⇣
Output:
Weights at time t + 1: wt+1 .
i , ⇠ ), i =
Examine the loss for each worker with reference dataset li = f (wt+1
R
1, 2, · · · , m;
q Pm
2
1 Pm
i=0 (li µ)
2: Compute the mean µ = m
=
for li ;
i=0 li and standard deviation
m

1:

3:
4:
5:

6:
7:
8:

Compute the normalized loss Li = li µ ;
Filter the uploaded weights with the normalized loss Gf = {i|e Li > ⌧ };
Filter Gf with the similarity of the previous gradient direction Gs = {i|i 2
i )/ , (w
Gf , SIM ((wt wt+1
wt )/ t 1 ) < ⇣};
t
t 1
L
Derive the ↵-weight aggregation parameters by ↵i = P e ei Li , i 2 Gs ;
i2Gs
P
i ;
Update the weights on time t: wt+1 = i2Gs ↵i wt+1
Send back the updated weights wt+1 to each worker.
Reference dataset-based loss filter. The reference dataset here is used to exam-

ine the performance of the uploaded weights computed by each node from their private
dataset. Because of the heterogeneity of the data distribution, the uploaded weights may
not be similar to each other. However, in the space of the whole dataset, the loss function
should have a decreasing trend for those uploaded weights. Because the reference dataset
is a subspace of the whole dataset, it can recognize this trend by examining the loss.
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Therefore, the reference dataset is an e↵ective way to find how the uploaded weights perform and distinguish computational results between Byzantine nodes and honest nodes.
In order to examine the performance of di↵erent nodes, the P S firstly computes the loss
li based on a reference dataset. Then it normalizes li and filters out the weights with
relatively larger loss using a loss filter parameter ⌧ . The intuition behind this filter comes
from Figure 1 in [110] and Figure 2 in [115], that is, Byzantine nodes must perform very
badly in order to successfully attack the training process and therefore, the loss of the reference dataset must be much larger than those honest nodes. Through the normalization
and filter process, it is easy to remove those outlier weights.
Update similarity-based filter. After the reference dataset-based loss filter, we
filtered out the uploaded weights who perform badly on the reference dataset. However, in
some extreme scenarios such as all the uploaded weights are from Byzantine nodes in one
synchronization, the normalized loss may have similar bad performance. Although this
scenario may occur with a very low probability in the real world, for example, 30 out of
100 nodes are Byzantine nodes and in each iteration, only 10 nodes are selected, then the
probability of all selected nodes are from Byzantine is around 10

6,

this still is a concern

to pollute the training process. Therefore we propose an update similarity-based filter to
filter out the weights that change much more than the update in the previous iteration.
We compare the similarity of the update in this iteration and the previous iteration and
filter out those who change too significantly. This is reasonable because the updates in
the training process usually have momentum, and thus the update change is mild. This
filter helps to deal with the extreme scenario that all participating nodes are Byzantine
nodes or some Byzantine nodes are not examined by the reference dataset. Here we let
x·y
SIM (x, y) = arccos ||x||||y||
+ b · ||x

y||. This guarantees the angle and distance change of

weights in adjacent iterations are bounded. Even if there are still weights from Byzantine
nodes, the influence on the current training process is not significant.
After these two filters, the weights that have extreme values are filtered out. Then we
aggregate the rest weights using an ↵-weighted average. Here we use the normalized loss
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on the reference dataset to measure the contribution of di↵erent nodes and set softmax
of them as the ↵-weight. This helps the training process learn more information from all
the uploaded weights in the heterogeneous federated learning environment. In the next
section, we also show ToFi performs well in experiments with practical conditions.

3.5.3

Remarks and Comparisons

The naive algorithm actually uses a lot of information provided by the reference dataset.
Therefore the performance depends on how good the reference dataset is. In fact, this
algorithm is like searching the minimum point of a function in a hyperplane whose coori
dinates are wt+1
and the objective function is the loss function on the reference dataset.

Thus the discrepancy between the loss function on the reference dataset and the real
whole dataset decides the performance. In a word, the naive algorithm uses the reference
dataset to examine the performance of computation results from each node’s local dataset
and search for the best next move by the information from both the local dataset and the
reference dataset.
Compared to the naive algorithm, the performance of ToFi does not fully depend on
the quality of the reference dataset. ToFi adopts two filters. The first filter of ToFi is
actually a practical modification of the naive algorithm. ToFi uses this filter to clean out
the weights with abnormal loss on the reference dataset, it is a better and faster way to
compute the optimization function in the naive algorithm. In addition, ToFi adds a second
similarity filter to filter out the abnormal weights whose change is too significant than
before. These two filters can cooperate to filter out those attack information. The reference
dataset in ToFi is more like an examination dataset to remove the outlier weights rather
than a decisive dataset to decide how to aggregate the weights in the naive algorithm.
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3.6

Experiments

In this section, several experiments are conducted to show the e↵ectiveness of our algorithm. Because the naive algorithm is very slow and inefficient in practice, we focus our
experiments on ToFi.

3.6.1

Experiment Environments Setting

In order to show how those two major di↵erences (non-i.i.d. dataset and the possible
minority of honest nodes) a↵ect the Byzantine problems, we first compare di↵erent algorithms with those two assumptions in the federated learning environment with all node
participation (i.e., all nodes are selected to perform the computation) and in the end, we
show how di↵erent algorithms perform in the federated learning environment with partial
node participation (i.e., some nodes are selected to perform the computation).
In this experiment, there are two challenges to set up experiment environments. One
is how to simulate a heterogeneous non-i.i.d. environment for our experiment dataset.
The other is how to simulate Byzantine attacks. In order to simulate a heterogeneous
non-i.i.d. federated learning environment, we conduct two di↵erent level methods. The
first method is a naive heterogeneous environment. It is simulated by evenly dividing the
whole dataset into slices and each worker keeps one slice sub dataset. Assume we have n
workers and the whole dataset is ⇠ = {x1 , x2 , · · · , xp }, then each worker keeps their sub
dataset as ⇠i = {xp//n·(i

1)+1 , · · · xp//n·i }.

The other method is an enhanced heterogeneous

environment. Similar to the previous method, we first sort ⇠ by the label. In this case, each
sub dataset only keeps the data with a similar label. The di↵erence between ⇠i should be
very significant. As for Byzantine attacks, in our experiment, we conduct three di↵erent
types of attacks. The first is the Gaussian attack. We simply generate Gaussian noise as
attack weights. The second method is wrong labeled attack [80, 121]. We let the label of
the Byzantine workers’ data be randomly placed, then the Byzantine worker just normally
computes the weights, and upload results with wrong labeled training results to the P S.
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The last method is one bit attack. For the uploaded weights, we only change one dimension
of it with a random value. Although our algorithm is capable of defending Byzantine
attacks in the bootstrap scenario, for simplicity, we fixed the Byzantine workers in the
experiment. In fact, the bootstrap scenario should have a better performance because no
subdataset is hidden by the Byzantine workers.
In our experiments, we use two most common datasets: MNIST dataset [117] and
CIFAR-10 dataset [50]. Both datasets have 10 categories of labels. We use a server with 4
Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080Ti GPUs to deploy our experiments. For the federated learning
environment with all node participation, we deploy 8 workers for the CIFAR dataset. Each
GPU keeps 2 workers. For the federated learning environment, we deploy 100 workers,
and 10 workers are randomly selected in each iteration. In our experiments, we will
compare our ↵-weighted based algorithm with four other algorithms: (i) simply average
aggregation with filtering out all Byzantine faults; (ii) score based algorithm Krum [9]; (iii)
median-based algorithm GeoMedian [15]; (iv) distance-based algorithm FABA [110]. In
the federated learning environment, we also compare with another reference dataset-based
algorithm Zeno [115]. For ToFi, we set the loss filter parameter ⌧ = 0.8, similarity filter
parameter ⇣ = 2, b = 1 and randomly select 500 data from the test dataset as reference
dataset and leave the rest as test dataset. We run all 5 algorithms with di↵erent Byzantine
environments and Byzantine attacks described above.

3.6.2

Federated Learning with All Node Participation on CIFAR-10

In this section, we show the results of the CIFAR-10 dataset.
3.6.2.1

Naive Heterogeneous Environment

We first compare ToFi with three classic methods and ground truth (filter out all Byzantine
attacks, average aggregation) in the three Byzantine environments we described above. We
choose ResNet-18 [44] as our neural network, 0.001 as the learning rate and SGD with
momentum and weight decay as optimizers. We use 10 as interval length to simulate a
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more general scenario. For normally federated learning of interval length 1 scenario, the
results are similar. Because we just want to compare the e↵ectiveness of defending attacks,
we do not optimize for the best accuracy. We first run experiments on naive heterogeneous
environments along with no Byzantine environment, the results are presented in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Experiment results of di↵erent algorithms for Gaussian, wrong label, one bit Byzantine attacks and no Byzantine attack scenario on naive heterogeneous environment

As we can see from Figure 3.3, Krum performs badly on defending against Byzantine
attacks in naive heterogeneous environments. ToFi and FABA have good and stable
performance on Gaussian attack and wrong label attack, but ToFi beats FABA on one
bit attack. This is because in the naive heterogeneous environment, although the dataset
is partitioned into slices, it is still randomly assigned. GeoMedian beats ground truth for
some epochs, but the performance is really unstable in some epochs. As for no Byzantine
environment, all methods perform well except Krum.
3.6.2.2

Enhanced Heterogeneous Environment

We then compare those algorithms in the enhanced heterogeneous environment. Because
the sub dataset in each worker is very di↵erent and any complicated neural networks
with batch normalization do not perform well in this environment, we use a LeNet [117]
in this scenario. Using group normalization [108] to substitute batch normalization in
complicated neural networks can be a good solution, but as we said that we only want to
compare the performance of defending attacks rather than good accuracy performance,
we choose to use a simple neural network. The results are presented in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Experiment results of di↵erent algorithms for Gaussian, wrong label, one bit Byzantine attacks and no Byzantine attack scenario on enhanced heterogeneous environment

From Figure 3.4, we can see that only ToFi and FABA are capable of defending Byzantine attacks in this scenario, among which ToFi performs slightly better than FABA in
the Byzantine environment and FABA is a little bit better than ToFi in no Byzantine
environment. This is because, in no Byzantine environment, the losses for all nodes are
similar, so ToFi may filter out some useful information by both filters. Krum and GeoMedian have really bad performance in this environment. We can see that all algorithms do
not perform very well compared to the ground truth, it is because, in this environment,
Byzantine attacks may hide some labels of data such that the training data is missed and
it will a↵ect the performance.
3.6.2.3

Majority Attack

In order to simulate the majority attack, we choose 5 of 8 workers as Byzantine workers and
use the same settings with the naive heterogeneous environment. Here we only examine
the Gaussian attack because all other attacks have similar performance. The results are
presented in Figure 3.5.
It is obvious that Krum, GeoMedian, and FABA cannot defend against majority
attacks. This is easy to understand because they only use information from uploaded
weights. When the majority of workers are malicious, those methods will only take the
malicious information as honest information and the whole training process will be dominated by Byzantine workers. ToFi uses the information from the reference dataset, so it
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Figure 3.5: Experiment results of majority Gaussian attack on naive heterogeneous environment

is still able to defend against this kind of attack.
3.6.2.4

Comparison of Reference dataset Sizes

In order to compare the influence of di↵erent reference dataset sizes, we use the same
settings as the naive heterogeneous environment. We examine three di↵erent attacks in
this environment for four di↵erent reference dataset sizes: 1000, 500, 200, and 100 to see
the performance change, the results are respectively in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.6.
Size
Gaussian
Attack
Wrong
Label
One
Bit

100
66.53%
1495.14s
66.09%
1455.33s
69.01%
1576.92s

200
66.06%
1615.61s
66.8%
1642.40s
69.69%
1751.29s

500
66.31%
1908.76s
65.98%
1939.99s
69.24%
2021.51s

1000
66.49%
2506.01s
66.69%
2498.38s
69.41%
2590.94s

Table 3.1: The best accuracy performance and time consumption for di↵erent reference dataset
sizes on di↵erent attacks

As we can see from Table 3.1 and Figure 3.6, di↵erent reference dataset sizes do not
vary much on the best accuracy performance, while the time consumption does change a
lot with the change of size. Therefore, a medium size of reference data (for example, 100
to 500) is good to defend against Byzantine attacks.
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Figure 3.6: Experiment results of di↵erent reference dataset size for Gaussian, wrong label and
one bit Byzantine attacks on naive heterogeneous environment for CIFAR-10 dataset

3.6.2.5

Comparison of Interval Length

We also compare how ToFi performs for interval length 1 and 10 for di↵erent attack types
in CIFAR-10 dataset. The results are presented in Table 3.2.
Interval Length
Gaussian
Wrong Label
One Bit

1
66.81%
66.77%
69.67%

10
66.49%
66.69%
69.41%

Table 3.2: The best accuracy performance for di↵erent interval length on di↵erent attacks for
CIFAR-10

As we can see from Table 3.2, the performances for di↵erent interval lengths are very
similar. The performance of interval length 1 is a little bit better than the performance
of interval length 10. This shows that our algorithm is able to solve the heterogeneous
byzantine problem in di↵erent interval length scenarios.

3.6.3

Federated Learning with All Node Participation on MNIST

All of the experiments in this subsection are using MNIST dataset [117]. The model we
are using is LeNet-5 [117].
3.6.3.1

Naive Heterogeneous Environment

We compare our ToFi with three classic methods and ground truth (filter out all Byzantine
attacks, average aggregation) in three Byzantine environments (Gaussian, wrong label, and
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one bit) we described in the CIFAR-10 experiment and no Byzantine environment. The
federated environment that we use here is a naive heterogeneous environment. We use 10
as interval length. The results are presented in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Experiment results of di↵erent algorithms for Gaussian, wrong label, one bit Byzantine attacks and no Byzantine attack scenario on naive heterogeneous environment for MNIST
dataset

From this figure, we can see that the performance of Krum is not as good as ToFi,
GeoMedian, and FABA, while these three methods have very similar performance in the
naive heterogeneous environment for these three di↵erent types of attacks. As for no
Byzantine scenario, the performances are similar among ToFi, GeoMedian, and FABA,
while Krum has a lower accuracy than those algorithms.
3.6.3.2

Enhanced Heterogeneous Environment

In order to show the di↵erence, we compare ToFi with three classic methods and ground
truth (filter out all Byzantine attacks, average aggregation) in three Byzantine environments (Gaussian, wrong label, and one bit) and no Byzantine environment. This time we
change the federated environment to the enhanced heterogeneous environment. We use
10 as interval length. The results are presented in Figure 3.8.
From this figure, we can see that ToFi has much better performance than Krum,
FABA, and GeoMedian. GeoMedian has the second-best performance for Gaussian and
one bit attacks. FABA has the second-best performance for wrong label attacks and
no Byzantine scenario. But both of them have a significant accuracy decline than our
algorithm. Krum has the worst performance in the enhanced heterogeneous environment.
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Figure 3.8: Experiment results of di↵erent algorithms for Gaussian, wrong label, one bit Byzantine attacks and no Byzantine attack scenario on enhanced heterogeneous environment for MNIST
dataset

3.6.3.3

Majority Attack

As for the majority attack, we choose 5 of 8 workers as Byzantine workers and use the same
settings with the naive heterogeneous environment. Here we only examine the Gaussian
attack. The results are presented in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Experiment results of majority Gaussian attack on naive heterogeneous environment
for MNIST dataset

As we can see from this figure, only ToFi is capable of defending the majority attack.
FABA, GeoMedian, and Krum are not able to deal with this scenario.
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3.6.3.4

Comparison of Reference dataset Sizes

We examine three di↵erent attacks in the naive heterogeneous federated environment for
four di↵erent reference dataset sizes: 1000, 500, 200, and 100 to see the performance
change, the results are presented in Figure 3.10. The best accuracy performance and time
consumption are presented in Table 3.3.
Size
Gaussian
Attack
Wrong
Label
One
Bit

100
99.21%
304.87s
99.22%
305.51s
99.2%
315.66s

200
99.22%
321, 78s
99.23%
316.76s
99.14%
329.18s

500
99.16%
340.95s
99.16%
340.58s
99.15%
348.86s

1000
99.21%
384.72s
99.2%
383.38s
99.18%
394.7s

Table 3.3: The best accuracy performance and time consumption for di↵erent reference dataset
sizes on di↵erent attacks for MNIST
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Figure 3.10: Experiment results of di↵erent reference dataset size for Gaussian, wrong label and
one bit Byzantine attacks on naive heterogeneous environment for MNIST dataset

As we can see from Figure 3.10 and Table 3.3, di↵erent reference dataset sizes do
not vary much on the accuracy performance. Only the time consumption changes. So in
practice, a medium-size reference dataset in P S is good enough.
3.6.3.5

Comparison of Interval Length

We compare how ToFi performs for interval length 1 and 10 for di↵erent attack types
in the naive heterogeneous environment. The interval length here means the number of
iterations until the next aggregation time. The interval length 1 scenario is the classic
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distributed machine learning that we do the aggregation every iteration, and the interval
length 10 is a simulated federated learning scenario that we do the aggregation every 10
iteration. The results are presented in Table 3.4.
Interval Length
Gaussian
Wrong Label
One Bit

1
99.21%
99.2%
99.18%

10
99.22%
99.18%
99.2%

Table 3.4: The best accuracy performance for di↵erent interval length on di↵erent attacks for
MNIST

As we can see from Table 3.4, the performances for di↵erent interval lengths are very
similar. This shows that our algorithm is capable of dealing with both classic distributed
machine learning scenarios and federated learning scenarios with di↵erent interval lengths.
3.6.3.6

More Workers Experiment

Because of the limitation of the hardware, we cannot make experiments for more workers
than 8 on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Here we only examine scenarios with more workers on
the MNIST dataset. In this experiment, we choose 32 workers, among which 8 out of 32
workers are Byzantine workers. To show the di↵erence, we examine this setting in the
enhanced heterogeneous environment. The results are presented in Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: Experiment results of di↵erent algorithms for Gaussian, wrong label and one bit
Byzantine attacks on enhanced heterogeneous environment with 32 workers for MNIST dataset

From Figure 3.11, it has a very similar performance with the 8-worker scenario. ToFi
still outperforms other algorithms. For the Gaussian attack, ToFi has a similar performance with FABA and beats all other algorithms. For wrong label attack and one bit
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attack, ToFi performs much better than others. The best performance here is not as good
as no Byzantine attack case. It is because in the experiment we fixed the workers who
su↵er Byzantine attacks. Since in this experiment we use the enhanced heterogeneous
environment, the data with some labels may be hidden by the Byzantine workers. This
will cause a decrease in the accuracy for the best performance.

3.6.4

Federated Learning with Partial Node Participation

We compare Krum, GeoMedian, FABA, and Zeno with ToFi in the federated learning environment with partial node participation. In our setting, 30% of 100 nodes are Byzantine
nodes and in each iteration, 10 nodes are randomly selected for computing. Here we use
CIFAR-10 and MNIST dataset, Gaussian attack, and enhanced heterogeneous environment. For other Byzantine attack types, the performance is similar. For FABA and Zeno
that need to estimate the number of Byzantine nodes, we set it as 30% ⇥ 10 = 3 in each
iteration. The results are respectively in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.12: Experiment results of Gaussian attack on enhanced heterogeneous environment in
federated learning

We can see that ToFi outperforms all other algorithms. It is because those algorithms
are not designed to solve the two major di↵erences in federated learning. When the
distribution of each node’s dataset is not i.i.d., Byzantine nodes may take the majority
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Figure 3.13: Experiment results of Gaussian attack on enhanced heterogeneous environment in
federated learning

in some iterations, and the number of Byzantine nodes changes during the training, the
performance downgrades a lot.

3.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we address a practical issue of Byzantine attacks in federated learning.
This is very di↵erent from Byzantine problems in classic distributed machine learning
because, in federated learning, the distribution of the dataset in each worker is non-i.i.d.,
Byzantine workers can be the majority and the number of Byzantine nodes can change
in di↵erent iterations. As far as we know, our project is the first work to address this
problem. We propose a naive algorithm and modify it to a reference dataset-based twofilter algorithm ToFi to adaptively filter out outlier computational results and take an
↵-weighted average based on the loss of all the uploaded weights from each worker as
the aggregation results in each iteration. In our experiments, we compare ToFi with four
existing algorithms in di↵erent environments with di↵erent kinds of Byzantine attacks and
show our superior performance.
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Chapter 4

Defenses against Byzantine
Attacks in Quantum Federated
Learning
4.1

Introduction

Quantum computing has been greatly developed in the past few decades [35, 41, 98]. The
idea of building a quantum computing-based Turing machine was firstly proposed in the
early 1980s by Paul Benio↵ [8]. Many explorations on that area were conducted by Richard
Feynman [31], David Deutsch [25], etc. and people started to believe that quantum computing has the capability to beat the classic computer in some tasks. In 1994, Shor’s algorithm was proposed to factor an integer using a quantum computer in polynomial time,
which is exponentially faster than the fastest classic algorithms [94]. Recently, Google
AI [3] and USTC [124] claimed quantum supremacy [38, 75] for tasks that are infeasible
on any classic computer. In the meantime, deep neural network [7, 24, 57] has been found
efficient in many practical tasks such as computer vision [39, 56, 64, 105], natural language
processing [14, 17, 26, 104], etc. It uses a hierarchy neural architecture to understand the
world and achieves great success in both industry implementation and academic research.
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In recent years, there is a trend of combining deep learning and quantum computing
together to mitigate the huge computational cost for larger and deeper classic neural networks. Therefore, the quantum neural network was naturally proposed [45]. In summary,
a quantum neural network uses the idea of a classic neural network in a quantum way
to learn from the training data. By utilizing the main property of qubit superposition
and entanglement in quantum mechanics, it tries to improve computational efficiency and
reduce the long training time and heavy computational resources in deep learning. There
is much work in this area [6, 36, 86, 90, 106].
However, similar to the distributed training in classic deep learning, the quantum
neural network also faces a similar demand. The di↵erence is that in deep learning, the
distributed training is proposed because of the limit of computational power in a single
machine, but in the quantum neural network, the distributed demand comes from the
property that the qubit in a quantum state is no-cloning [12, 63, 107]. Therefore, once
we have several quantum machines that keep their local quantum data, collaborative
training is necessary if we want to train a global model. Here we introduce federated
learning [48,70] to solve this problem. Federated learning is a collaborative way to train a
global model where each node has its private local data in the classic machine learning area.
It is naturally an appropriate prototype to collaborate with multiple quantum machines.
In this chapter, we learn from this idea and propose a QuantumFed framework. Our
contributions are summarized below:
• We propose QuantumFed, a quantum federated learning framework to collaborate
multiple quantum nodes with local quantum data together to train a global quantum
neural network model.
• We conduct several simulation experiments to show that our QuantumFed framework
is capable to collaborate multiple nodes and is robust for noisy data. In addition,
we compare the performance of choosing di↵erent hyperparameters.
• We transform our previous proposed Byzantine tolerant algorithms FABA and ToFi
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in the quantum environment. Simulated experiments are conducted to show that
our modified quantum version algorithm is still able to resist Byzantine attacks in
the quantum federated learning framework.

4.2

Preliminaries

4.2.1

Quantum Computing Basis

In quantum computing, the qubit is the basic unit to represent the information. A qubit
has two basis states |0i and |1i like the classic bit in a traditional computer, but it can
also be in a superposition, which is a combination of the two basis states | i = ↵|0i + |1i
where ↵2 +

2

= 1. Therefore, a qubit is capable to express more information than a

classic bit. When observing the qubit, it will collapse to one of the basis states with
corresponding probability, and thus we can get a statistically accurate estimation after
sufficient times of observations. Besides, the entanglement of qubits allows more qubits to
have correlations with each other and n qubits, in this scenario, will have 2n basis states
and can be in a superposition among them, which carries an exponentially increasing
amount of information.
In order to perform computations on the qubits, there are several common quantum
logic gates: Pauli-X, Pauli-Y, Pauli-Z, Hadamard, Controlled Not. Unlike the AND and
OR gate from classic computer, quantum operators are always reversible and will obtain
an output with the same dimension, and thus can be represented as a unitary. If we
represent the input qubits state as a column vector, for example, | i =
p1 |10i
3

+

p1 |11i
3

p1 |00i + p1 |01i +
6
6

! [ p16 , p16 , p13 , p13 ]T , the output of the quantum operators are unitaries

left multiplying states. We list the unitary representation of some common quantum logic
gates in Table 4.1.
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Gate
Pauli-X
Pauli-Y
Pauli-Z
Hadamard

Controlled Not

Unitary

0 1
1 0
0
i
i
0

1 0
0 1
1 1
p1
2 1
13
2
1 0 0 0
60 1 0 07
6
7
40 0 0 15
0 0 1 0

Table 4.1: Unitary representation of common quantum logic gates.

4.2.2

Quantum Neural Network

There are lots of explorations of implementing deep neural networks in a quantum way,
that is, using a quantum perceptron in order to get similar generality as classic neural networks. In this article, we adopt a widely used quantum deep neural network architecture
as Figure 4.1. Assume in layer l, the input is a state ⇢l
ρ1

ρin

1

qubits and this layer

ρout
UL,1

U1,2

Input
layer

of ml

ρL

U1,1

...
...

U1,m1

1

UL,2

layer 1

layer L

output
layer

Figure 4.1: An architecture example of the quantum neural network.
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will give an output of ml qubits, then the l-the layer transition map E l is given by:
E l (⇢l
U l is the 2ml

1 +ml

⇥ 2m l

1

) = trl

1 +ml

1 (U

l

(⇢l

1

†

⌦ |0 · · · 0il h0 · · · 0|)U l )

(4.1)

dimensional perceptron unitary of layer l. A partial trace

operation is performed to get the output state of layer l. For simplicity, we apply U l by
sequentially applying ml independent perceptron unitaries U l,j that act on ml 1 input
Q
qubits and j-th qubit in layer l, that is, U l = 1j=ml U l,j . Note that U l,j here are acting
on the current layer, which means U l,j is actually U l,j ⌦ Il1,···j

1,j+1,···ml .

In this way, we

can feedforward the input state layer by layer to get an output state:
⇢out = E out (E L (· · · E 2 (E 1 (⇢in )) · · · ))

(4.2)

The hyperparameters of the quantum deep neural network are the unitaries, so as long
as we have the network structure and unitaries, we can describe a model. The method
to derive the unitaries is very similar to backpropagation, which we will discuss in the
following section.
In order to represent the input and output data in a quantum way, for data that is
stored by classic bits, we need to first transform the data to qubit representation. One
way to do this is that we can use a d-qubits state | id to represent a superposition of
Pd
d
2d basis states in Hilbert space H2 , that is, | id = 2i=1 ↵i |zi i where ↵i is the complex
d

amplitude and zi is a basis state in H2 . In this way, we can transform the classic data
to quantum data, and then we can use the quantum data to train the quantum neural
network and perform the inference.

4.2.3

Federated Learning

Federated learning is a special kind of collaborative distributed learning in the machine
learning area to train a global model across multiple computational devices or nodes that
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keep their private local training data. The major di↵erence between federated learning
and distributed learning is data heterogeneity. Because each node keeps their private data
and does not share with each other or the central server, the data distribution is usually
non-i.i.d. and the data volume is di↵erent across di↵erent nodes. In federated learning,
the central server only keeps a global model and does not keep data. Each device or
node queries a global model at some time, performs local updates on their local data, and
uploads the update information to the central server. During one iteration, the central
server receives all the update information and updates the global model by aggregating
local updates. In classic neural network environment, the global model parameter at time
t is wt . Assume there are m participating nodes at time t and node i performs local update
to get updated model wti = LocalUpdate(wt ). The LocalUpdate function is the classic
gradient descent for one or more steps on local data. Then after the central server receives
all the local updated models, it aggregates those models and updates the global model
by wt+1 = GlobalUpdate(wt1 , wt2 , · · · , wtm ). In practice, we usually simply use a weighted
average function as GlobalUpdate to aggregate the uploaded models, where the weight is
usually the data volume of each node.

4.3

QuantumFed Framework

In this section, we will describe our QuantumFed framework in detail.

4.3.1

Update Method

In order to train a quantum deep learning model, each quantum node performs a local
update based on its local data. According to the previous work, there are two methods
to train the local model. In quantum neural networks, the analog of the model weight in
classic neural networks is the model perceptron unitary U . Therefore, we can summarize
the following two methods to update the model.
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• Updating model by applying unitaries. In order to update the perceptron unitary U ,
we can apply an update unitary. Like [6], we define the model update as U ! ei✏K U .
Here ✏ is the update step size and K is the update matrix.
• Updating model by gradient descent. An alternative way to update the perceptron
unitary is to use the gradient descent [30]. However, unlike implementing the gradient descent in classic deep learning model, we cannot directly derive the gradient for
each element in the perceptron unitary and perform the gradient descent for each
element. Therefore, based on the qubit size of perceptron unitary, we can rewrite
P
U using pauli operators such that U = eiK and K = ↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l k↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l ↵1 ⌦
↵2

⌦ ··· ⌦

↵l

where

↵i

is pauli operators. In this way we can transform the

gradient descent on U to k↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l . Let C(·) be the cost function, we can update
the perceptron unitary by k↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l

k↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l

·

@C(·)
@k↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l

where

is the

learning rate.
In this section, we use the first method (updating model by applying unitaries) as an
example method to illustrate our QuantumFed framework. Later we will show that we
can also derive a similar structure as applying unitaries when we adopt gradient descent.

4.3.2

Cost Function

The cost functions in classic neural network are usually mean squared error loss or crossentropy loss. Although these cost functions can still be applied in quantum neural networks, they are not easy to compute with quantum operations. Here like [6], we use fidelity
as our cost function to measure the di↵erence between label data states and output states.
Fidelity represents the probability that one state will be identified as the other state in
one measurement. Let (

in ,
x

out ), x
x

= 1, 2, · · · , N be the training data and ⇢out
be the
x

output states that are derived by the current quantum neural network with the input data
in ,
x

the cost function C is:
C=

N
1 X
h
N
x=1

out out out
x |⇢x | x i
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(4.3)

(4.3) measures the closeness between two states. When the output states are not pure,
q
P
out 1/2 ⇢out out 1/2 )2 . Note
we can use a generalized fidelity function: C = N1 N
(tr
x
x
x
x=1
that the value of fidelity cost function is between 0 and 1, while 1 expresses the best
performance.

4.3.3

Local Update

The local update is performed in each node in the quantum federated learning system.
The goal of the local update is to maximize the cost function to 1 based on the local
dataset in the given steps (interval length). In quantum neural networks, the analog of
the model weight in classic neural networks is the model perceptron unitary U , and the
model update is defined as U ! ei✏K U . Here ✏ is the update step size and K is the
update matrix. Therefore, each local step is to maximize the cost function by choosing an
appropriate update matrix:
K = argK max(C(ei✏K U, (
C(U, (
(

in ,
x

in ,
x

out ))
x

out ).
x

The

in
x ,

out
x ))

kKk22 )

(4.4)

is the fidelity cost of a model with perceptron unitary U and local dataset
kKk2 is introduced by a Lagrange multiplier

to bound the norm of

update matrix K and k · k2 is the matrix L2 -norm.
data in node n, Unl,j

in ,
n,x

out ), x
n,x

= 1, 2, · · · , Nn be the local training
Q
be the perceptron unitary of layer l, perceptron j and Unl = 1j=ml Unl,j ,

Specifically, on the node n side, let (

the output states of data x at layer l ⇢lx equal to trl

l l 1
1 (Un (⇢x

†

⌦ |0 · · · 0il h0 · · · 0|)Unl )

similar to [6], we can derive the update matrix Kjl by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Let the cost function be the fidelity defined in (4.3), we can solve (4.4)
using gradient ascent by the following:
N

Kjl

n
2ml 1 i X
trrest Mxl,j
=⌘
Nn

x=1
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(4.5)

trrest is over all qubits that are not a↵ected by Unl,j and Mxl,j is computed by Mxl,j =
Q
Q
Qj+1
† Q l
l,↵ †
l,↵
l
[ 1↵=j Unl,↵ (⇢lx 1 ⌦ |0 · · · 0il h0 · · · 0|) j↵=1 Unl,↵ , m
↵=ml Un ]. Here
↵=j+1 Un (Il 1 ⌦ x )
F l is the adjoint channel to E l and
Proof: Assume C(s) = C(U, (

in ,
n,x

l
x

= F l+1 (· · · F out (|

out )),
n,x

out ih out |)).
n,x
n,x

C(s + ✏) = C(ei✏K U, (

in ,
n,x

out ))
n,x

to represent

out
the cost function before and after the local update respectively, and ⇢out
x (s), ⇢x (s + ✏) are

defined likewise, by Taylor’s expansion, we have:
⇢out
x (s + ✏)
out

out

=trin,hidden (ei✏Kmout Unout,mout (s)ei✏Kmout 1 Unout,mout
†

h0 · · · 0|)Un1,1 e

i✏K11

†

· · · Unout,mout e

out
i✏Km
out

1

1

(s) · · · ei✏K1 Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out

)

=⇢out
x (s) + i✏trin,hidden (
†

†

out
1,1
out,mout
Km
U out,mout (s) · · · Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
(s))
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)Un (s) · · · Un
out n
†

†

1,1
out,mout
out
Unout,mout (s) · · · Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
(s)Km
+ ···
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)Un (s) · · · Un
out
†

†

1,1
out,mout
+ Unout,mout (s) · · · K11 Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
(s)
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)Un (s) · · · Un
†

†

1,1
1
out,mout
Unout,mout (s) · · · Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
(s)) + O(✏2 )
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)Un (s)K1 · · · Un
†

out
out,mout
1,1
=⇢out
(s) · · · Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
x (s) + i✏trin,hidden ([Kmout , Un
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)Un (s) · · ·
†

†

1,1
Unout,mout (s)] + · · · + Unout,mout (s) · · · Un1,2 (s)[K11 , Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)Un (s)]
†

†

Un1,2 (s) · · · Unout,mout (s)) + O(✏2 )
Here ⇢in
x =|

in ih in |.
n,x
n,x

Then we can compute the derivative of cost function as:

dC(s)
C(s + ✏) C
= lim
✏!0
ds
✏
i✏ PNn
out
out
C(s) Nn x=1 h out
C(s)
n,x |trin,hidden (⇢x (s + ✏))| n,x i
= lim
✏!0
✏
N
n
1 X
out
out
out,mout
=
(Iin,hidden ⌦ | out
(s) · · · Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
n,x ih n,x |([iKmout , Un
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)
Nn
x=1
†

†

Un1,1 (s) · · · Unout,mout (s)] + · · · + Unout,mout (s) · · · Un1,2 (s)[iK11 , Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out
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†

†

†

h0 · · · 0|)Un1,1 (s)]Un1,2 (s) · · · Unout,mout (s)))
Nn
1 X
1,1 †
out,mout †
=
tr([Unout,mout (s) · · · Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
(s),
n,x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)Un (s) · · · Un
Nn
x=1

Iin,hidden ⌦ |

out
out
out
n,x ih n,x |]iKmout

†

†

1,1
+ · · · + [Un1,1 (s)(⇢in
n,x ⌦ |0 · · · 0ihidden,out h0 · · · 0|)Un (s),

†

Un1,2 (s) · · · Unout,mout (s)(Iin,hidden ⌦ |
=

out
out
out,mout
(s) · · · Un1,2 (s)]iK11 )
n,x ih n,x |)Un

Nn
i X
out
tr(Mxout,mout Km
+ · · · + Mx1,1 K11 )
out
Nn
x=1

This is given by the property that the trace of a product can be switched without changing
Q
Q
† Q l
l,↵ †
the result. Here we let Mxl,j = [ 1↵=j Unl,↵ (⇢lx 1 ⌦|0 · · · 0il h0 · · · 0|) j↵=1 Unl,↵ , m
↵=j+1 Un (Il
Qj+1
l,↵
l
l
l
l
l+1 (· · · F out (| out ih out |)).
x)
n,x
n,x
↵=ml Un ] and F is the adjoint channel to E and x = F
Let ↵i denote each qubit in the previous layer and

current layer. We also denote
X

Kjl =

↵1 ,··· ,↵ml

1⌦

denote the current qubit in the

as the Pauli matrices. Then we can assume:
l
kj,↵
1 ,··· ,↵m

l 1

,
1

(

↵1

⌦ ··· ⌦

↵m l

1

⌦

)

Because we would like to maximize (4.4), using gradient ascent, we would like to maximize the gradient to get the fastest growth direction with the condition of bounded K.
Therefore, we would like to optimize K for:

K = arg max(
K

= arg max(
K

= arg max(
K

dC(s)
ds

0

X

l
kj,↵
1 ,··· ,↵m

2
l 1

)

↵i ,beta

Nn
i X
out
tr(Mxout,mout Km
+ · · · + Mx1,1 K11 )
out
Nn
x=1

0

X
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2
l 1

)

↵i ,beta

Nn
i X
out
tr↵i , (trrest (Mxout,mout Km
+ · · · + Mx1,1 K11 ))
out
Nn
x=1

l
kj,↵
1 ,··· ,↵m

0

X

↵i ,beta

l
kj,↵
1 ,··· ,↵m

2
l 1

)

l
Let the derivative of kj,↵
1 ,··· ,↵m

l 1

Nn
i X
tr↵i , (trrest (Mxl,j )(
Nn

equals to 0, we have:

↵1

x=1

⌦ ··· ⌦

↵m l

1

⌦

))

l
2 0 kj,↵
1 ,··· ,↵m

l 1

=0

This is equivalent to:

l
kj,↵
1 ,··· ,↵ml

1

i
=
2Nn

0

Nn
X

tr↵i , (trrest (Mxl,j )(

↵1

x=1

⌦ ··· ⌦

↵ml

1

⌦

))

Then we can derive Kjl :
Kjl =

X

l
kj,↵
1 ,··· ,↵m

l 1

↵i ,

=

i
2Nn

0

Nn
XX

(

↵1

⌦ ··· ⌦

↵m l

tr↵i , (trrest (Mxl,j )(

↵i , x=1

1

↵1

⌦

)

⌦ ··· ⌦

↵m l

1

⌦

))(

↵1

⌦ ··· ⌦

↵m l

1

⌦

)

N

=⌘

n
2m l 1 i X
trrest (Mjl )
Nn

x=1

Here ⌘ =

1

0

⌅

as the learning rate.

From Proposition 1, we can derive a closed-form update matrix for each perceptron
unitary. This update matrix is an analog of the gradient in the classic neural network, and
the way to derive it is like the back-propagation process. Therefore, we can update the
perceptron unitary like gradient descent based on local data and Proposition 1 for each
step to maximize the cost function.
In classic federated learning, participating nodes are not required to do only one-step
gradient descent in each iteration. Therefore, we also assume that the local perceptron
unitary can update for several steps. Here we define the number of steps as the interval
length Il . Then the local update algorithm QuanFedNode is described in Algorithm 5.
In QuanFedNode algorithm, there are basically two steps:
• Feedforward step. We apply the input state of the training data to the quantum
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neural network and feedforward it to every qubit by using the perceptron unitaries.
• Temporary update step. We first compute the unitary update matrix Kjl for layer
l, perceptron j by Proposition 1. Then the local temporary update is derived by
l

Unl,j = ei✏Kj Unl,j . Meanwhile, we also compute another update unitary at interval k
l,j
Un,k
=e

n Kl
i✏ N
j
N
t

. Nt is the number of data on all participating nodes in this iteration.

l,j
Un,k
is computed for global update and will be sent to the central server later.

The temporary update will be processed in each participating node with their local training
l,j
data and repeat for Il times. Then we can simply send the update unitaries Un,k
to the

central server.
Algorithm 5 QuanFedNode (Node n Side)
Input:
Network architecture: there are L layers in the quantum neural network and layer l
has ml quantum perceptrons;
A copy of network perceptron unitaries from the global model Unl,j = Utl,j ;
out
Training data: ( in
n,x , n,x ), x = 1, 2, · · · , Nn ;
Interval length Il ;
Total number of data among all participating nodes Nt ;
Learning rate ⌘ and update step size ✏;
Output:
Send the update unitaries to central server.
Set the interval index k = 1;
2: If k <= Il , continue to the next step, otherwise go to step 6;
3: Feedforward the training data at each layer:
1:

• For every layer l, apply the current channel E l to layer l 1: let Unl =
• Let ⇢lx = trl
4:

l l 1
1 (Un (⇢x

†

Q1

j=ml

Unl,j ;

⌦ |0 · · · 0il h0 · · · 0|)Unl ) and store ⇢lx for every layer;

Temporarily update the network:
• Compute the unitary update parameter at layer l, perceptron j Kjl by (4.5);
l,j
• Store update unitary at interval k Un,k
=e

network by
5:
6:

Unl,j

=e

i✏Kjl

n Kl
i✏ N
j
N
t

Unl,j ;

Let k = k + 1 and go to step 2;
l,j
Send all stored update unitaries Un,k
to central server.
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, and temporarily update the

4.3.4

Global Update

The global update is performed on the central server side. It maintains a global model that
is updated by each node’s local data and update unitaries. The goal of the global update
is to maximize the cost function based on the global dataset among all quantum nodes.
Because the data is stored in each node and the central server is not able to access the
private local data, the global update can only be computed based on the update unitaries
that are uploaded by each node. We describe the QuanFedPS algorithm in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 QuanFedPS (Central Server Side)
Input:
Network architecture: there are L layers in the quantum neural network and layer l
has ml quantum perceptrons;
Total number of nodes N and number of selected nodes in each iteration Np ;
Total synchronization iterations Ns ;
Number of training data on node n Nn ;
Interval length Il ;
Output:
The trained quantum neural network.
Initialize the network by randomly choosing all the unitaries Utl,j , set the iteration
index t = 1;
2: If t <= Ns , continue to the next step, otherwise go to step 6;
3: Randomly select Np nodes from all nodes. Assume the set of selected node indexes
P
is Sn , compute total number of data among all participating nodes Nt = n2Sn Nn .
l,j
For each selected node, run QuanFedNode algorithm and get update unitaries Un,k
;
4: Compute the global update unitaries by applying update unitaries from all selected
nodes:
1
Y
Y l,j
l,j
U =
Un,k
(4.6)
1:

k=Il n2Sn

l,j
Update the global model by Ut+1
= U l,j Utl,j ;
6: Let t = t + 1 and go to step 2;
7: Output the trained quantum neural network model.

5:

Basically, there are three major steps in QuanFedPS algorithm:
• Initialization step. At the beginning of the quantum federated training process,
the central server first initializes the model parameters (perceptron unitaries) by
randomly assigning the value.
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• Node selection step. Like the classic federated learning framework, we need to
randomly select Np nodes out of all N nodes who will participate in the current iteration. This can help improve the randomness of the data distribution and decrease
the data heterogeneity. Besides, it can reduce the communication cost by selecting
fewer nodes.
• Global update step. After participating nodes complete the local training and send
update unitaries back to the central server, the central server updates the global
model by applying those update unitaries and finish the current iteration. We will
take the global model update for Ns iterations.
The design of global update is based on the observation that the order of applying
update unitaries almost does not matter and the update unitaries almost surely have
multiplicative identity property when ✏ ! 0. Theoretically, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Assume U1 = ei✏K1 , U2 = ei✏K2 are two update unitaries and K1 , K2 are
bounded by the L2 -norm, we have lim✏!0 U1 U2 = ei✏(K1 +K2 ) at convergence speed O(✏2 ).
Proof: By Taylor’s expansion, we have:
U1 = I + i✏K1 + O(✏2 )
U2 = I + i✏K2 + O(✏2 )
ei✏(K1 +K2 ) = I + i✏(K1 + K2 ) + O(✏2 )

Then we have:
U1 U2

ei✏(K1 +K2 ) = O(✏2 )

(4.7)

From (4.7), we can derive lim✏!0 U1 U2 = ei✏(K1 +K2 ) at convergence speed O(✏2 ).

⌅

From Lemma 9, when ✏ is small enough, we can rewrite the global update unitaries
(4.6) as:
U

l,j

=

1
Y

e

i✏Kkl,j

, Kkl,j

k=Il
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=

P

n2Sn

P

l,j
Nn Kn,k

n2Sn

Nn

(4.8)

l,j
Here we define Kn,k
as the update matrix for node n at step k, layer l, and perceptron j.
l,j
Note that the update matrix Kn,k
is derived from (4.5), and (4.5) is actually an average

of the partial trace of Mxl,j for all the local data. Therefore, if we denote the dataset on
S
node n is Dn , and Dp = n2Sn Dn , we have:
Kkl,j

=

P

n2Sn (Nn ⌘

2ml 1 i

= ⌘P

n2Sn Nn

2m l 1 i
Nn

P

P

n2Sn

X

x2Dn

trrest Mxl,j )

Nn

trrest Mxl,j

x2Dn

This is equivalent to compute for a local update on the union dataset of the data on all
participating nodes in this iteration when k = 1. So when the interval length is set to
1, QuantumFed framework is exactly the same as training on a single quantum machine
with all data. However, when the interval length is greater than 1, things become much
more complicated. We will discuss about this problem in next subsection.

4.3.5
4.3.5.1

Discussions
GD vs SGD

The QuanFedNode algorithm that we described in Algorithm 5 uses all the training data
in each update step. Therefore, the training process is more like gradient descent (GD)
in classic deep learning. In this setting, each step gets the information from all training
data, so we can derive the best update unitaries based on current step size and learning
rate. However, like GD, the time complexity increases linearly with the size of training
data increases. We have to spend a lot of speed on each step, which will cause the training
speed very slow. An alternative training method is by randomly choosing a mini-batch of
training data in each step, which is an analog of mini-batch stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) in classic deep learning. SGD can solve the biased data distribution problem by
introducing randomness and reduce the computational cost. In the experiment part, we
will compare GD-type and SGD-type quantum federated training.
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4.3.5.2

Interval Length > 1

As we discussed before, when Il = 1, QuantumFed framework is exactly the same as
training on a single machine. When Il > 1, because of the local temporary update,
the update unitaries that are computed after the first step are based on the temporarily
updated model parameters, which are not the same as each other participating nodes
in one iteration. One way to understand it is that since we usually choose a small ✏,
the temporary update is a small perturbation of the perceptron unitaries. Assume the
perceptron unitary is Up and the update unitary is Uu = ei✏Ku . By Taylor’s expansion,
the update perturbation is given by:

Uu Up

Up = (I + i✏Ku + O(✏2 )

I)Up

= (i✏Ku + O(✏2 ))Up

Therefore, the perturbation is small compared to the perceptron unitary when ✏ is small
and Ku is bounded, and intuitively we can consider the local temporary updated model
as the same model. We also show it is feasible to use a larger interval length in the
experiment, where it reduces the synchronization iterations and accelerates the training
speed.
4.3.5.3

Gradient Descent Based Update

In Section 4.3.1, we discussed two basic methods to update the perceptron unitary. Our
QuantumFedPS algorithm is based on update unitaries to transmit the update information
between the central server and each quantum node. However, when we adopt gradient
descent based update, it is not intuitive to get the update unitary for communications. In
fact, when we adopt gradient descent, as Section 4.3.1 shows, we can use pauli operators to
P
rewrite the perceptron unitary U = eiK and K = ↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l k↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l ↵1 ⌦ ↵2 ⌦· · ·⌦ ↵l
and perform the gradient descent as k↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l
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k↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l

· @k↵ @C(·)
. Therefore,
,↵ ,··· ,↵
1

2

l

we can actually transform the update to:

U

When

e

iK i

P

@C(·)
↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l @k↵ ,↵ ,··· ,↵
1 2
l

(4.9)

is small, this can be approximated as:

U

Ugd U, Ugd = e

i

P

@C(·)
↵1 ,↵2 ,··· ,↵l @k↵ ,↵ ,··· ,↵
1 2

l

(4.10)

This can also be considered as applying update unitaries to current perceptron unitary. In
fact, in a quantum computer, unitary represents the basic operator and thus the gradient
operation also must be conducted by the unitaries. We can record that as the update
information and implement the same QuantumFedPS algorithm to aggregate and update
the global model.
4.3.5.4

Data Heterogeneity

Data heterogeneity is a natural problem in classic federated learning. Because each node
keeps its private local data, it has a high possibility that the data distribution among all
nodes is not i.i.d. The non-i.i.d. data can cause serious performance degradation in the
classic neural network while conducting batch normalization in the model, while it is a very
common layer in most of the state-of-the-art models. In the quantum federated learning
model, because there is no batch normalization layer, as we discussed in Section 4.3.4,
there is no performance di↵erence when Il = 1. Therefore, data heterogeneity is not a
problem in our QuantumFed framework.
4.3.5.5

Why Unitary

When communicating between the central federated server and each quantum node, we
choose to use an update unitary matrix as the model parameters for transmission. The
reasons are below. First, in classic federated learning, each node sends a local updated
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model, or gradient to the central server. In quantum neural network, the analogue is the
l,j
local updated network unitary Unl,j or updated unitary Un,k
. Second, the central server

can simply apply the update unitaries from each worker to update the global model. It is
more convenient and reduces the computations on the central server side. Third, unitary
is the basic operation in quantum mechanics. Therefore it is easier to optimize at the
system level.
4.3.5.6

Learning Rate and Step Size

In our QuanFedNode algorithm, there are learning rate ⌘ and step size ✏ to control the
update and they have di↵erent meanings. ✏ is derived from classic quantum neural network
update, and ⌘ is derived from how we would like to bound the update matrix K. A larger
⌘ leads to a tighter bound of K. However, we can rewrite the update unitary by:
l,j
Un,k
=e

n Kl
i✏ N
j
N
t

=e

i✏⌘ 2

ml 1
i
Nt

P Nn

x=1

trrest Mxl,j

(4.11)

We can actually combine ✏ and ⌘ to one parameter. Later in the Appendix, we conduct
some experiments to show that it is similar to adjust ✏ and ⌘. For convenience and easy
to understand, we set

= 1.0 at all time and fine tune the step size by adjusting ✏ in

practice.
4.3.5.7

Generality

The generality of QuantumFed framework has two aspects. First is the generality of
approximating an arbitrary functions. This is actually based on the generality of the
quantum neural network. In a quantum neural network, the analog of general function
is unitary, that is, we would like to let our quantum neural network map an arbitrary
unitary. From [6], we know that the network we use can implement an arbitrary completely
positive map and therefore is universal. The other aspect is the generality of applying this
framework to di↵erent network architectures. Because our framework is based on sending
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the update unitaries to the central server, it is easy to adapt all kinds of architecture and
training methods. As long as the update is conducted by applying update unitaries, our
framework is suitable to implement.

4.4

Experiment

In this section, we conduct simulated experiments for our QuantumFed framework.

4.4.1

Environment Setup

Here we use a quantum environment simulated by QuTip library

1

(Quantum Toolbox in

Python). We set up our experiment environment in the following aspects.
First, in order to get the training data, we randomly generate a global unitary Ug
which is the unitary we would like to approximate. Then we randomly generate the
training data input and apply the global unitary to the input to get the corresponding
output. We use the randomly generated input and output pair as the clean training data.
The same method is applied to generate the test data. In this way, we can generate clean
training data (|

in i, U | in i)
g n,x
n,x

on the node n side, and test data (|

in
in
test,x i, Ug | test,x i)

on

the central server side. In order to show the robustness of the training, we also pollute
a proportion of training data with randomly generated input and output to get noisy
training data.
Second, as for the quantum neural network architecture, because the experiments that
we conduct are in a simulated environment using a classic computer and the computational
complexity increases exponentially with the width of the network increases, we choose to
train small size quantum neural networks with a width that are not greater than 3. In
this section, if not specified, we choose a network of size 2-3-2.
Third, in order to simulate the heterogeneous federated learning environment, we put
similar training data into the same node. We first gather all the generated training data
1

QuTip: https://github.com/qutip/qutip
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from all nodes, sort them by their vector representation value, and divide them to each
node in order. In this way, we can somehow guarantee that the data on each node is not
i.i.d.
Fourth, we measure the experiment results using two metrics. First metric is the
fidelity cost function that we defined in (4.3), to show the probability that the output
state will be identified as the output label in a measurement. We also adopt another
metric mean square error (MSE) that are widely used in classic machine learning as a
comparison. The MSE is defined below:
N
1 X out
MSE =
k⇢x
N
x=1

|

out
out 2
x ih x |k

(4.12)

We examine our experiments using both metrics on the training and test data respectively
to show the performance.
We set ⌘ = 1.0, ✏ = 0.1, N = 100, and Np = 10 if not specified.

4.4.2
4.4.2.1

Experiment Results
Accuracy

We first show how a [2, 3, 2] quantum network performs with di↵erent interval lengths in
Figure 4.2. Here, the interval length of 1 case is actually the same as the scenario that is
running on a single machine. Therefore, we can see that after 50 iterations, all of them
reach the fidelity of approximately 1 and MSE of approximately 0 on both training data
and test data. This shows that our QuantumFed framework works on collaborating di↵erent quantum nodes for training a global model. Besides, we can find that the performance
becomes better when we conduct more local steps in each iteration. This is because we
have more local training on local data, which learns more information in each iteration.
In addition, as a comparison, we also plot the SGD scenario with interval length 2, here
we use a mini-batch of 5 for this experiment. We can see that the convergence speed is
slower a little bit, which makes sense because we have fewer data in each iteration, but
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Figure 4.2: Experiment results of a [2, 3, 2] quantum network with di↵erent interval lengths.

the final performance is similar. This shows that our framework is feasible for both SGD
and GD optimization.
4.4.2.2

Robustness

We then show the performance of a [2, 3, 2] quantum network with di↵erent ratio of noisy
data. We compare the data with 10% noisy data to 90% noisy data on noisy training
data and clean test data. The results are presented in Figure 4.3. As we can see from
the figure, the performance keeps acceptable when the noise data ratio is no more than
70%, while the final performance is similar when the noise ratio is no more than 50%.
This shows the robustness of our QuantumFed framework where it is able to converge to
a correct point even with a considerable proportion of noisy data.

4.4.3

Comparison of Di↵erent Network Architectures

In this section, we first compare the performance of di↵erent quantum network architectures. Because of the simulation limit of the computational resources, we only compare
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Figure 4.3: Experiment results of a [2, 3, 2] quantum network with di↵erent ratio of noisy data.

four architectures: [2, 2], [2, 3, 2], [1, 2, 1], [2, 3, 3, 2]. The results are shown in Figure 4.4.
It is easy to find that all four quantum networks are capable to have an acceptable performance in federated setting, while [2, 2], [2, 3, 2], [1, 2, 1] networks perform better than
[2, 3, 3, 2] network. This actually shows that in quantum neural networks, a larger-sized
network may not outperform a shallow network. Therefore, it is important to choose an
appropriate network architecture to perform specific training tasks.

4.4.4

Comparison of Di↵erent ✏ Choices

In order to show the performance di↵erence of di↵erent ✏ choices, we conduct experiences
on a [2, 3, 2] network with N = 100, Np = 10, ⌘ = 1.0 and di↵erent ✏. The experiment
results are presented in Figure 4.5. From this figure, we can find that when ✏ = 0.1 or
0.05, the training approximates to the phase with the fidelity of 1 and MSE of 0. When
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Figure 4.4: Experiment results of four di↵erent quantum networks.

✏ = 0.01, the training speed is really slow and the training does not converge after 50
synchronization iterations. When ✏ = 0.2, the training speed outperforms training with
smaller ✏ for the first several iterations, but the performance downgrades a little bit in the
following iterations and then keeps at a lower level. This may be caused by converging
to other points. When ✏ = 0.5, it is obvious that the training does not converge. The
performance changes back and forth in each iteration. This can be explained similar to
the case in gradient descent. A larger step size will disturb the training and make each
iteration go across the best point and not converge.

4.4.5

Comparison of Di↵erent ⌘ Choices

We conduct the similar experiments to compare how the choice of ⌘ a↵ects the performance
of the training. We go through the experiments with the same parameter same settings
and di↵erent ⌘ choices. The results are presented in Figure 4.6. From this figure, we
can find that when ⌘ = 1.0 or 1.25, the training has the fast convergence speed and best
performance, while if we choose ⌘ = 0.5 or 0.33, the convergence speed declines a lot
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Figure 4.5: Experiment results of a [2, 3, 2] quantum networks with di↵erent ✏.

but still is acceptable. When ⌘ chooses a relatively larger value, such as 2 and 5. The
convergence will be misleading to the wrong point. Here we can see that the choices of ⌘
and ✏ have a similar performance. In practice, we can fix the choice of ⌘ and only adjust
✏ to get the best performance.

4.4.6

Comparison of Di↵erent Proportions of Participants

Here we choose di↵erent numbers of participants and di↵erent numbers of total nodes to
figure out the influence of the participant proportion. In order to show the di↵erence,
we conduct two experiments. First, we set the total number of nodes to 10 and change
the number of participants. Then we fix the number of participants to 10 and change the
number of total nodes. The results are respectively in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. Because
the training data and test data are synthetically generated, the final performance does not
vary much. However, the convergence speed does make a di↵erence. When all of the nodes
are selected to perform computations in each iteration, the convergence rate is the fastest.
This is easy to understand because we got the full information of the whole dataset. Since
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Figure 4.6: Experiment results of a [2, 3, 2] quantum networks with di↵erent ⌘.

the final performance is similar, we can choose the proportion of participants according
to actual conditions in practice.

4.5
4.5.1

Byzantine Problems in QuantumFed
Problem Definition

Like classic federated learning, when the central server communicates with multiple quantum devices, the quantum federated learning also faces the threats of Byzantine attacks.
In QuantumFed, byzantine problems happen when some of the quantum nodes perform
the computation maliciously. We use Figure 4.9 as an example, when transmitting the
update information with the central server, instead of uploading the real update unitaries,
the byzantine nodes (Node 4) send a randomly generated or malicious unitary to the
server. Theoretically, we define the byzantine model in QuantumFed as follows. Assume
that Ui is the correct update unitary computed by node i with local training data, and
UiR is the actual update unitary received by the central server from node i, we have:
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Figure 4.7: Experiment results of a [2, 3, 2] quantum networks with di↵erent number of participants.

Definition 3 (Byzantine Model in QuantumFed)

UiR =

8
>
>
<Ui

>
>
:Ua 6= Ui

if node i is honest

(4.13)

otherwise

Because the QuanFedServer updates the global model by successively applying the
update unitaries received by each participating node, the Byzantine attacks may significantly harm the training process or even make the whole global model converge to a totally
wrong model. Therefore, it is necessary to check if the previously proposed algorithms are
still capable of defending against Byzantine attacks in quantum federated learning.
In order to transform classic Byzantine-resilient algorithms into the quantum scenario,
some modifications are needed because of the gap between classic federated learning and
quantum federated learning. The gap comes from the update information between the
central server and each node. In classic federated learning, the update information is the
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Figure 4.8: Experiment results of a [2, 3, 2] quantum networks with di↵erent number of total
nodes.

gradient or weight computed by each node and it can be represented as a tensor. However,
in quantum federated learning, the update information can only be represented as a unitary
matrix, which is in a di↵erent space and the distance and norm are totally di↵erent from
the tensor space. Therefore, in the following sections, we discuss the quantum versions
of distance-based algorithm FABA, score-based algorithm Krum, and reference datasetbased algorithm ToFi. In the end, we also discuss the reason that meidan-based algorithms
are difficult to transform to quantum versions.

4.5.2

Quantum Version of FABA

The major change of the distance-based algorithm FABA in quantum computing is from
the change of norm and distance metric. Because here our operations are based on unitaries, we cannot use the classic Euclidean distance in tensor operation. Here we use an
element-wise matrix Euclidean distance instead. Assume U1 , U2 are unitaries of size n ⇥ n
i,j
and ui,j
1 , u2 are corresponding entries in U1 and U2 where i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. The distance
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Figure 4.9: An example of Byzantine problem in a four-node quantum federated learning environment.

between U1 and U2 d(U1 , U2 ) is defined as:
v
uX
n
u n X
d(U1 , U2 ) = t
(ui,j
1

2
ui,j
2 )

(4.14)

i=1 j=1

Other than the distance metric, we also need to compute the average of some unitaries
when implementing FABA. Here we use the similar element-wise average over unitaries. If
i,j
i,j
we assume U3 , · · · , Um and ui,j
3 , · · · , um similar as before, each element ua of the average

matrix Ua is defined as:

m

ui,j
a =

1 X i,j
uk
m

(4.15)

k=1

Note that Ua is not necessarily a unitary.

Based on these changes we can implement FABA in our QuantumFed framework.
The algorithm is described in Algorithm 7.

4.5.3

Quantum Version of Krum

For the score-based algorithm Krum, the gap between the classic version and quantum
version is roughly similar to the gap in FABA. In the Krum algorithm, the core step is
to get the k-nearest neighbors of each uploaded gradients. In the quantum scenario, the
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Algorithm 7 Quantum Version of FABA
Input:
The number of selected nodes Np . Without loss of generality, assume they are node
1, node 2, · · · , node Np ;
The received update unitaries computed from selected nodes:
GU
=
R
R
R
{U1 , U2 , · · · , UNp };
The assumed proportion of Byzantine workers: ↵;
Initialize k = 1.
Output:
The updated global model.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

If k < ↵ · Np , continue, else go to Step 5;
Compute mean of GU as U0 using (4.15);
For every UiR in GU , compute the di↵erence d(U0 , UiR ) using (4.14). Delete the one
that has the largest di↵erence from GU ;
k = k + 1 and go back to Step 1;
Use the rest update unitaries in GU to continue the QuanFedServer algorithm in
QuantumFed framework and derive the updated global model.

analog is to find the k-nearest neighbors of each uploaded update unitaries. Therefore, we
must have a new distance metric between unitaries to transform Krum into a quantum
version. As we discussed in Section 4.5.2, the distance metric between two unitaries is
defined as (4.14). Here we can adopt the same element-wise matrix Euclidean distance to
the Krum algorithm. We describe the quantum version of Krum in Algorithm 8.

4.5.4

Quantum Version of ToFi

Implementing the reference dataset-based algorithm ToFi in classic federated learning and
quantum federated learning is roughly similar. However, there are some small di↵erences
listed below.
• The update similarity-based filter is based on the update unitaries rather than computing by the local updated weight. The similarity is based on the element-wise
matrix Euclidean distance defined in (4.14).
• Because the optimal value of our cost function is 1, we update the reference datasetbased loss filter by filter out the update unitaries with small examined loss.
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Algorithm 8 Quantum Version of Krum
Input:
The number of selected nodes Np . Without loss of generality, assume they are node
1, node 2, · · · , node Np ;
The received update unitaries computed from selected nodes:
GU
=
R };
{U1R , U2R , · · · , UN
p
The assumed proportion of Byzantine workers: ↵;
Output:
The updated global model.
Compute the estimated Byzantine tolerant parameter f = ceiling(Np · ↵);
For each UiR in GU , find the Np f 2 closest update unitaries. Denote the set of
those Np f 2 update unitaries of UiR as Ci . Here we use the distance metric in
(4.14) to define the distance;
3: For each UiR , compute the corresponding score si using:
X
si =
d(UiR , UjR )
(4.16)
1:
2:

j2Ci

4:

Derive the index i⇤ with the smallest score:
i⇤ = argi min si

5:

(4.17)

Use the rest update unitary UiR⇤ to continue the QuanFedServer algorithm in QuantumFed framework and derive the updated global model.
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• Because there is no ↵-weight in our QuantumFed framework, we skip the softmax
function that assigns the ↵-weight.
We also keep a small reference dataset in the central server to examine the loss and filter
out abnormal update unitaries. According to the above changes, we can implement our
ToFi algorithm in the QuantumFed framework. The quantum version of ToFi is described
in Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9 Quantum Version of ToFi
Input:
The number of selected nodes Np . Without loss of generality, assume they are node
1, node 2, · · · , node Np ;
The received update unitaries computed from selected nodes:
GU
=
R
R
R
{U1 , U2 , · · · , UNp };
Reference dataset ⇠R ;
Model parameter unitary U ;
Predefined loss filter parameter ⌧ ;
Output:
The updated global model.
Here we let f (U, ⇠R ) be the loss function on the model parameter unitary U and
reference dataset ⇠R . Examine the loss for each node with reference dataset li =
f (UiR U, ⇠R ), i = 1, 2, · · · , Np ;
r
P Np
2
1 P Np
i=0 (li µ)
2: Compute the mean µ = N
l
and
standard
deviation
=
for li ;
i
i=0
Np
p
1:

Compute the normalized loss Li = li µ ;
4: Filter the uploaded update unitaries with the normalized loss Gf = {UiR |e Li < ⌧ };
5: Use the rest update unitaries in Gf to continue the QuanFedServer algorithm in QuantumFed framework and derive the updated global model.
3:

4.5.5

Discussion about Median-based Algorithms

As for the Median-based algorithm, it is very hard to be directly transformed to the
quantum version. The reasons are below:
• There is no quantum analog for a geometric median of unitaries. The definition
of geometric median in classic Euclidean space is the point minimizing the sum of
distances to the sample points. Although we can still define the similar geometric
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median in unitary space to find the unitary that minimizes the sum of distances to
other unitaries and use the element-wise matrix Euclidean distance, it is not feasible
here because of two reasons. First, it is very hard to get this unitary by simply
modifying the current algorithm to find the geometric median in Euclidean space.
A new algorithm needs to be designed. Second, even if we can solve this geometric
median, it may not be suitable in a quantum scenario because the geometric median
in Euclidean space and unitary space have di↵erent properties and meanings.
• In classic distributed learning, the aggregation method is by taking the average of
the uploaded gradients. Geometric median also takes similar properties and it can
achieve a similar performance without Byzantine attacks. However, in the QuantumFed framework, the global update is performed by successively applying the
update unitaries. Simply changing it to apply by a geometric median unitary may
cause incorrect training.
Therefore, we choose not to derive a quantum version of median-based algorithms. It
needs more explorations for median-based algorithms in the quantum scenario.

4.5.6
4.5.6.1

Experiment Results
Environment Setup

In the experiment, we conduct the same QuantumFed environment as Section 4.4.1 to
simulate the synthetic training data, quantum neural network architecture, and heterogeneous federated learning environment. We use no operation as a comparison to see the
performance if we take no operation for the Byzantine attack.
In order to simulate the Byzantine environment, we use Gaussian distribution to
generate a random hermitian matrix and transform it to a random unitary as the attack
update unitary. We choose 30% as the Byzantine ratio which means 30% of the total
quantum nodes are Byzantine nodes. We also simulate a clean environment without
Byzantine attacks as a comparison.
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We use [2, 3, 2] quantum neural network, fidelity and MSE loss metrics, and set
⌘ = 1.0, ✏ = 0.1.
4.5.6.2

Quantum Federated Learning with All Node Participation

In this experiment, we set N = 10, Np = 10, which means there are a total 10 nodes and in
each epoch, and all nodes are selected to perform computations in each synchronization.
We compare FABA, ToFi, Krum, no operation, and ideal cases when there are no Byzantine attacks in Byzantine environment and clean environment. The experiment results are
presented in Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10: Experiment results of a [2, 3, 2] quantum network with FABA, Krum, ToFi, No
Operation and No Byzantine in the quantum federated learning Byzantine and clean environment
with all node participation.

As we can see in Figure 4.10, both FABA and ToFi are capable of defending against
Byzantine attacks in all participating quantum federated learning. FABA is a little bit
faster than ToFi, but the performance is very similar. Krum seems to have the trend to
defend against Byzantine attacks, but the speed is very slow and thus is not practical.
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In a clean environment without Byzantine attack, we can see that FABA achieves better
convergence speed than ToFi. It is because, in a clean environment, the loss performance of
each node is similar. After the normalization, some useful information may be filtered out.
Therefore, the training speed is slower than FABA. Krum still has the worst performance.
4.5.6.3

Quantum Federated Learning with Partial Node Participation

We set N = 100, Np = 10 to simulate the quantum federated learning environment with
partial node participation. We totally set 100 quantum nodes, among which 30 of them
are Byzantine nodes. In each iteration, 10 nodes are randomly selected to perform computations. The experiment results are shown in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11: Experiment results of a [2, 3, 2] quantum network with FABA, Krum, ToFi, No
Operation and No Byzantine in the quantum federated learning Byzantine and clean environment
with partial node participation.

From Figure 4.11, it is obvious that only ToFi can defend against Byzantine attacks
in the quantum federated learning environment with partial node participation. FABA
can somehow defend this attack, but the performance is worse and very unstable. Krum
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has the worst performance and the performance is even similar to the no operation case.
As for the clean environment, the performance is similar to the all node participation
scenario.
4.5.6.4

Discussions

Our simulated experiments show that the previously proposed algorithm FABA and ToFi
are still capable of defending against Byzantine attacks in quantum federate learning.
Although Krum has the trend of defending Byzantine attacks, the convergence speed of
Krum is very slow and thus is not feasible in practice. Similar to classic federated learning,
only ToFi is Byzantine resilient in the federated learning environment with partial node
participation. However, the exploration of Byzantine problems in quantum federated
learning is still at an early stage. We only use Gaussian distribution to generate Byzantine
attacks. It still needs further research about how to defend and attack quantum federate
learning systems.

4.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we propose a novel quantum federated learning framework to collaborate
multiple quantum nodes with local quantum data. Several experiments are conducted to
show the feasibility and robustness of our QuantumFed framework. Moreover, we explore
how to transform our Byzantine resilient algorithms to a quantum environment and compare the performance of the modified algorithms in the Byzantine QuanFed environment.
With the emergence of quantum computing, the potential of quantum neural networks is
massive. We believe the requirement for the collaborative training of multiple quantum
devices will be tremendous in the near future.
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Chapter 5

Conclusion and Future Work
Nowadays, the proliferation of deep neural networks in practical implementations has
achieved great success and brought convenience for people, but deep neural networks also
become more complicated for precise and complex tasks, where one single machine is
not able to a↵ord this huge request of computations. Meanwhile, the rapid growth of
smart devices gives more computational power to personal devices such as laptops, mobile phones, etc. Therefore, it is a trend to collaborate the computational resources from
di↵erent devices, and thus distributed machine learning is proposed. However, because
of the heterogeneous environment of the computing nodes in the distributed system, the
Byzantine problem is a serious threat to collaborative model training. In this dissertation, we focus on the Byzantine problem and study the major di↵erences in three di↵erent
scenarios: (i) classic distributed deep learning, where each subdataset in each worker is
i.i.d.; (ii) federated learning, where subdataset is non-i.i.d. and there may be the malicious majority in some iterations; and (iii) quantum federated learning, where the update
information is based on update unitaries. In order to defend against Byzantine problems
in classic distributed deep learning and federated learning, we proposed Byzantine tolerant algorithms FABA, VBOR, and ToFi. We also modify FABA and ToFi to quantum
versions for quantum federated learning. We conduct various simulated experiments for
covering di↵erent Byzantine environments and get inspiring results to show the feasibility
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and robustness of our algorithms.
In the process of exploring Byzantine-tolerant algorithms in distributed machine
learning, there are some useful experiences.
• In classic distributed machine learning, because of the i.i.d. dataset, the Central
Limit Theorem ensures that the computational results of the upload information for
each node are similar. Therefore, the Byzantine problem becomes an outlier removal
problem. The current Byzantine-resilient algorithms in this scenario have the similar
idea of using the majority update behavior to approximate the aggregation result
or filter out the attack information. For example, score-based algorithms focus on
assigning each update information a score based on their proximity to the neighbors;
median-based algorithms use the geometric median to estimate the majority information; distance-based algorithms filter out the outlier update information based on
distance similarity.
• In federated learning, as we discussed, there are two major di↵erences compared
with classic distributed machine learning: non-i.i.d. dataset and possibly malicious
majority. These di↵erences make the outlier removal strategy not work well in
federated learning because the update information may not be similar to each other
and the majority may be malicious. However, although all the workers have the noni.i.d. dataset, the objective of each worker is the same. The goal of the training is
to minimize the cost function on the whole dataset. Therefore, whatever their local
update information is, we can check the worker by their performance on a reference
dataset. Although it is very important to resist Byzantine problems in federated
learning because of the heterogeneous environment, the research on this direction is
still at a relatively early stage. It is worth exploring how to defend against Byzantine
attacks in this area with other conditions except for the reference dataset.
• In quantum federated learning, the update information is presented in the unitary
space rather than the Euclidean space. Therefore, the malicious information and
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the aggregation results are presented in the unitary space as well. In order to defend
against Byzantine problems in this scenario, we need to carefully investigate the distance metric between di↵erent update information and keep the aggregation results
in the unitary space. The current empirical results show similar performance for the
quantum version Byzantine-resilient algorithms with classic distributed learning, but
future research is still needed for more general attacks.
Many other scenarios are worth studying for Byzantine problems. We list some below
and leave them for future work.
• In the IoT [47, 67] and edge computing area [89, 91, 92], there are a large number of
devices with few data and limited computational resources. As a result, the data
distribution is extremely unfair and non-i.i.d. This is a common scenario in the
future and it needs more research about how to defend Byzantine attacks in IoT
and edge computing scenarios.
• Split federated learning [79, 103] becomes more popular recently. It splits the deep
neural network into two parts where each device runs a shallow part on board and
leaves the rest complicated part in the server. Because the system architecture is
di↵erent from the classic distributed system, the Byzantine problem is still a big
threat.
• While we focus on how to defend against Byzantine attacks, it is also important
to learn how to efficiently attack the current distributed system such as [29, 72],
which can help us better understand Byzantine problems and design a more robust
algorithm.
• It is useful to implement a practical add-on Byzantine resilient algorithm library for
current primary deep learning frameworks such as PyTorch [78] and TensorFlow [1].
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